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Beginning with a series of several self-report questionnaire studies I examine the potential for 
everyday attention lapses to create an inability to form connections to the external world, particularly 
through the experience of chronic boredom, and to subsequently lead to depression. In the first study I 
examine this process through the intermediate role of memory failures in the onset of boredom and 
depression, while in the second I examine the role of self-efficacy and in the third I add psychological 
stress as a further intermediate step between attention lapses and depression. For each study 
significant associations are found between self-report measures of attention lapses and attention-
related cognitive errors, as presumed causes, and boredom proneness and depression as presumed 
outcomes. Structural equation modeling is then used to show these associations are well explained by 
an Attention-to-Affect model in which the attention lapses and attention-related errors predict the 
onset of boredom and depression, in part through their effects on memory failures (Chapter 1), 
perceived self-efficacy (Chapter 2), and psychological stress (Chapter 3). That these Attention-to-
Affect models provide much better fit for the data runs contrary to the typical conception of attention 
and memory problems as consequences of emotional distress. Following from these models I examine 
in more specific terms the disconnect experienced as a result of attention lapses, through a laboratory 
study employing the Sustained Attention to Response Task. This study (Chapter 4) revealed a 
significant influence of attentional challenges on blinking behaviour, suggesting that whenever our 
attentional capacity is tested we have a tendency to momentarily direct our thoughts inwardly, 
perhaps to re-evaluate our attentional performance, and that the timeframe of this redirection is 
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Overview 
“I sat down to-day, at about ten o'clock in the forenoon, in Sleepy 
Hollow, - a shallow space scooped out among the woods, which surround 
it on all sides, it being pretty nearly circular, or oval, and two or three 
hundred yards in diameter. The present season, a thriving field of Indian 
corn, now in its most perfect growth, and tasselled out, occupies nearly 
half the hollow; and it is like the lap of bounteous Nature, filled with 
breadstuff. On one verge of the hollow, skirting it, is a terraced pathway, 
broad for a wheel track, overshadowed with oaks, their long, knotted, 
rude, rough arms between earth and sky; the gray skeletons, as you look 
upward, are strikingly prominent amid the green foliage. Likewise there 
are chestnuts, growing up in a more regular and pyramidal shape; white 
pines, also; and a shrubbery composed of the shoots of all these trees, 
overspreading and softening the bank on which the parent stems are 
growing; - these latter being intermingled with coarse grass. Observe the 
pathway; it is strewn over with little bits of dry twigs and decayed 
branches, and the brown oak leaves of last year, that have been moistened 
by snow and rain, and whirled about by winds, since their departed 
verdure; the needle-like leaves of the pine, that we never noticed in 
falling, - that fall, yet never leave the tree bare; and with these are 
pebbles, the remains of what was once a gravelled surface, but which the 
soil accumulating from the decay of leaves, and washing down from the 
bank, has now almost covered. The sunshine comes down on the pathway 
with the bright glow of noon, at certain points; in other places there is a 
shadow as deep as the glow; but along the greater portion sunshine 
glimmers through shadow, and shadow effaces sunshine, imaging that 
pleasant mood of mind where gayety and pensiveness intermingle. ... 
Now we hear the striking of the village clock, distant, but yet so near that 
each stroke is impressed distinctly upon the air. This is a sound that does 
not disturb the repose of the scene: it does not break our sabbath; for like 
a sabbath seems this place, and the more so on account of the cornfield 
rustling at our feet. It tells of human labor, but, being so solitary, now it 
seems as if it were on account of the sacredness of the sabbath. Yet it is 
not so, for we hear at a distance mowers whetting their scythes; but these 
sounds of labor, when at a proper remoteness, do but increase the quiet of 
one who lies at his ease, all in a mist of his own musings. There is the 
tinkling of a cow-bell, a noise how peevishly dissonant if close at hand, 
but even musical now. But, hark! there is the whistle of the locomotive, - 
the long shriek, harsh above all other harshness, for the space of a mile 
cannot mollify it into harmony. It tells a story of busy men, citizens, from 
the hot street, who have come to spend a day in a country village, - men 
of business, - in short, of all unquietness; and no wonder that it gives such 
a startling shriek, since it brings the noisy world into the midst of our 
slumbrous peace.” (Hawthorne, 1884, pp. 498-503). 
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In the epigraph above Hawthorne describes the wondrous bounty found in sustained attention to, 
and contemplation of, one‟s present and ongoing experience. The sheer breadth and detail of his 
observations, much of which has been omitted, highlights the richness that can be found in everyday 
life, if you are able and choose to look for it. In addition, the tone suggests an inherent pleasantness in 
the experience of attending to all the little details, one that isn‟t diminished even by the sound of 
workers in the distance or a cowbell that in other circumstances might have been an annoying 
disturbance. Contrast this pleasantness, then, with the profound change of mind and feeling brought 
about by the harsh shriek of a locomotive. The sound seems to demand an interruption of 
Hawthorne‟s attention, and furthermore, replaces his mental quietness with the noise and jumble of 
business; in short, with the mind of someone who in his hurried work is both distracted and 
distractable. This, it seems, is an unhappy mind, out of touch with the world around it. In this way, 
Hawthorne describes the complex interplay of attention and emotion, which is the topic of the current 
paper. Going forward I will argue that an inability to attend effectively to our ongoing, everyday, 
experiences is an important cause of emotional dysfunction, particularly to the extent that chronic 
attention lapses make it difficult to fully engage the external world and, in time, produce boredom 
proneness and, ultimately, depression. 
My colleagues and I have argued that attention plays a key role in the experience of boredom 
proneness (Cheyne, Carriere, & Smilek, 2006; Carriere, Cheyne, & Smilek, 2008; Carriere, Nelson, 
Cheyne, & Smilek, 2010) inasmuch as boredom proneness may reflect a chronic failure to engage and 
sustain attention despite having ample stimulation available at the time (Berlyne, 1960; Damrad-Frye 
& Laird, 1989; Hebb, 1966). Specifically, one‟s general inability to engage and sustain attention, 
particularly in the face of personally significant goals, may become self-perceived as a lack of 
motivation and interest in work, school, and personal relationships, ultimately leading to persistent 
negative affect; all commonly identified in boredom (O‟Hanlon, 1981; Sommers & Vodanovich, 
2000). Interestingly, depression is often seen to bring with it a variety of very similar motivational, 
interpersonal and other cognitive deficits, as found in numerous studies (e.g., Christopher & 
MacDonald, 2005; Farrin et al., 2003; Hasher & Zacks, 1979; Karasu, Gelenberg, Merriam, & Wang, 
2000; Wagle, Berrios, & Ho, 1999; Watts & Sharrock, 1985) and in the DSM-IV diagnostic criteria 
(American Psychiatric Association, 1994). Hence, extending from the experience of boredom 
proneness, I will argue throughout this paper that chronic attention lapses can also lead to the more 
serious and persistent negative affect characteristic of depression. 
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The initial state of mind described above by Hawthorne is not unlike that of one practicing 
mindfulness meditation. It is important to the present argument, then, that mindfulness techniques are 
being employed with some success in the treatment of depression (Kabat-Zinn, 1982; 2003; Segal, 
Williams, & Teasdale, 2002; Williams, Teasdale, Segal, & Kabat-Zinn, 2007). Given this new 
direction in the treatment of depression, Smallwood, Fishman and Schooler (2007) have recently 
suggested individuals with depression and dysphoria may suffer from meta-cognitive problems 
resulting in the use of counter-productive thought control strategies. Indeed, ruminative thinking, in 
particular, is very common among depressed individuals (Smallwood et al., 2003) and is thought to 
exacerbate depressive symptoms by occupying attention and priming negative thoughts (Purdon, 
2003). Although such cognitive failures have frequently been identified as an important component of 
depression they have traditionally been viewed as an outcome, not a cause, of the more complex 
emotional dysfunctions present in depression. As such, even when a course of treatment has been 
directed primarily at improving the functioning of basic attentional processes (Papageorgiou & Wells, 
2000), the motivation behind this intervention has been derived from a questionable and complex 
theory of interactions between rumination, self-focused attention, and maladaptive beliefs reflective 
of the typical view of depression as a cause of cognitive dysfunction. In contrast to this conceptual 
confusion, the present argument allows the straightforward approach of suggesting that depression 
may in some cases be treatable through attention training alone simply because chronic inattention 
was a primary mechanism in the initial onset of depression; and so treating attention allows the 
individual to re-engage with the world and eliminates the cause of emotional distress. 
In the first three chapters I present a series of models in support of the hypothesis that attention 
lapses are capable of producing affective dysfunction. In Chapter 1 (previously published; Carriere et 
al., 2008), I build on a previous model of the interaction between attention lapses and memory 
failures, to show boredom proneness and depression may be caused by these cognitive deficits. In 
Chapter 2 (submitted for publication; Carriere et al., 2010), I examine whether attention lapses can be 
seen as influencing self-efficacy, and thereby contribute to boredom and depression. This model is 
extended in Chapter 3, to include psychological stress as an additional intermediate step in the route 
from inattention to depression. Finally, in Chapter 4, I provide experimental support for these models 
through an examination of the hypothesis that attention lapses produce immediate, momentary, 




The Affective Consequences of Mindlessness 
1.1 Introduction 
Lapses of attention and memory failures, commonly known as absentmindedness, are a familiar 
occurrence in our daily lives. Generally, these lapses result in only minor inconveniences, such as a 
brief loss of time while trying in vain to find an object that is sitting in full view, or failing to 
remember what one needed to pick up at the supermarket. These same lapses can, however, also have 
dramatic and life-threatening consequences, such as when a pilot fails to lower the plane‟s landing 
gear while approaching a runway (e.g., Transportation Safety Board of Canada, 2004) or a surgeon 
leaves forceps in a patient during surgery (Gawande, Studdert, Orav, Brennan, & Zinner, 2003). From 
these examples it is apparent that even minor disruptions in basic cognitive processes such as 
attention and memory can have numerous unforeseen and potentially far reaching consequences. The 
present chapter examines some of the additional potential long-term consequences of momentary 
everyday attention lapses. In particular, I examine the long-term effects of everyday lapses of 
attention and memory on two theoretically related affective dysfunctions: boredom and depression. 
The relation between mind wandering and affective dysfunction has been established for some time 
(e.g., Watts & Sharrock, 1985). Recent research has raised the possibility that relatively small 
everyday lapses of attention can have important consequences with regard to one‟s affective state, and 
may even lead to affective dysfunction. This conclusion is consistent with research conducted by 
Farrin, Hull, Unwin, Wykes, & David (2003), examining the extent to which cognitive failures are 
related to depression via a combination of the Sustained Attention to Response Task (Robertson, 
Manly, Andrade, Baddeley, & Yiend, 1997) and the Cognitive Failures Questionnaire (CFQ; 
Broadbent, Cooper, FitzGerald, & Parkes, 1982). This research reported a strong correlation between 
the CFQ and depression, and a significant correlation between performance on the SART and 
depression. That lapses of attention can have a significant effect on one‟s affective state is also 
consistent with research by Smallwood and colleagues showing a positive association between mind 
wandering and dysphoria (Smallwood et al., 2003; Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). Finally, additional 
support for the role of attention in affective dysfunction comes from previous work on everyday 
attention lapses by Cheyne, Carriere, and Smilek (2006), in which they examined the relation between 
self-report measures of attention lapses, attention-related cognitive errors, and boredom proneness. 
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One of the results of this research was the finding of a robust relation between the propensity to 
experience attention lapses and boredom proneness, again suggesting attention lapses can play a 
significant role in one‟s affective state.  
Cheyne and colleagues (2006) have already hypothesized that attention plays a key role in many of 
the most common conceptions of boredom. Indeed, an examination of the research on boredom 
reveals that it is typically viewed as an inability to engage and sustain attention (Berlyne, 1960; 
Damrad-Frye & Laird, 1989; Hebb, 1966) and is a typical outcome when we are either (a) prevented 
from taking a desirable action, or (b) forced into an undesirable action (Fenichel, 1951). However, 
particularly striking is the subjective experience of boredom in which one is unable to maintain 
attention on any object, despite being entirely free to do so, and the possibility of substantial 
individual differences in boredom proneness as a result of one‟s general tendency to be inattentive. 
Viewing inattention as contributing to a mental disconnection from and eventual emotional 
devaluation of the world around us, i.e., boredom, represents a novel reconception of the way emotion 
and cognition are typically thought to interact, and opens up new possibilities for managing our 
emotions. 
Evidence in support of the idea that attention can have a direct causal influence on affective state 
comes from a study reporting that selective inhibition of distractor stimuli during visual search leads 
to affective devaluation of those stimuli (Fenske & Raymond, 2006). Unlike the endogenous 
attentional disconnect of boredom, in this case the visual search task itself creates the demand that 
one not pay attention to specific objects. Nonetheless, such research does support the possibility that 
one‟s tendency to be inattentive – and one‟s subsequent inability to maintain attention on any object 
or experience, despite being free to do so – may play a causal role in the general affective devaluation 
of one‟s experiences that is found in boredom. Consistent with this conceptual analysis Cheyne and 
colleagues (2006) found a significant association between the Boredom Proneness Scale (BPS; 
Farmer & Sundberg, 1986) and a direct measure of the propensity to experience attention lapses, the 
Mindful Attention Awareness Scale (MAAS; Brown & Ryan, 2003). The data were insufficient, 
however, to test a causal model of the relation between attention lapses and affective dysfunction as 
reflected in boredom. Nonetheless, they proposed that a potential consequence of a chronic inability 
to engage and sustain attention is a lack of interest in everyday events, as is typically experienced in 
boredom, leading to a loss of meaning in everyday tasks, a lack of motivation, and persistent negative 
affect (O‟Hanlon, 1981; Sommers & Vodanovich, 2000). 
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Feeling a loss of meaning in everyday tasks and a persistent negative affect are characteristic not 
only of boredom but also of more serious affective dysfunction; most notably, depression (Abramson, 
Metalsky, & Alloy, 1989). Thus, attention lapses may well have similar influences on cognitive and 
affective aspects of depression. The relation between attention lapses and depression is supported by 
research conducted by Wagle, Berrios, and Ho (1999) and by Farrin and colleagues (2003), reporting 
significant correlations between a questionnaire assessing a variety of everyday cognitive failures (the 
Cognitive Failures Questionnaire), including attention and memory failures, and a questionnaire 
designed to assess depression (the Beck Depression Inventory). As well, clinical perspectives on 
depression often cite attentional problems as one of several cognitive outcomes and assert that they 
are resolved through treatment of the underlying depressive disorder (e.g., Christopher & MacDonald, 
2005; Hasher & Zacks, 1979; Karasu, Gelenberg, Merriam, & Wang, 2000; Watts & Sharrock, 1985). 
Indeed, the importance of addressing attentional problems early on in Cognitive Behavioural Therapy 
(CBT) treatments for depression can be seen in the recommendations of Hollon, Haman, and Brown 
(2002), who note: 
“. . . a depressed patient often feels overwhelmed and unable to cope 
with life‟s demands. In fact, the patient may indeed be facing serious 
demands in a number of different areas: friction in relationships, 
financial difficulties, or insufficient work productivity. Such a 
patient may be encouraged to make a list of what he or she needs to 
do and then to break large tasks into their smallest constituent steps.” 
(p. 385). 
Although the authors explain the use of this intervention as motivated by the desire to combat 
unrealistic beliefs that are thought to play a causal role in depression, in line with the emphasis on 
dysfunctional beliefs inherent in the CBT perspective, it is important to note that the intervention is 
clearly to teach coping strategies for dealing with difficulty sustaining attention to specific, normally 
manageable, tasks. Indeed, though it has received little notice, one clinical study (Papageorgiou & 
Wells, 2000) reported that depression can be treated successfully via an attention training regimen 
only, suggesting that the failures of basic cognitive mechanisms at play in attention lapses are capable 
of playing a causal role in modifying depression. 
Another basic cognitive process one could expect to play a role in affective dysfunction is memory, 
particularly since it is closely associated with both attention (Cowan, 1995) and depression 
(Christopher & MacDonald, 2005; Moore, Watts, & Williams, 1988). To date few studies have 
closely examined the specific association between boredom and memory. Wallace, Kass, and Stanny 
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(2002), however, have recently shown a substantial positive correlation between the BPS and the 
memory component of the CFQ, indicating a strong association between boredom and memory 
failures. A follow-up study then demonstrated the BPS to be a significant predictor of the CFQ 
overall (Wallace, Vodanovich, & Restino, 2003). Together, these findings suggest boredom could 
have substantial effects on memory performance, though the reverse remains a distinct possibility as 
well. Similarly, depression is also thought to have pervasive effects on memory processes, ranging 
from an inability to voluntarily recall specific memories to long-term episodic memory deficits and 
the involuntary recall of negative memories (Blaney, 1986; Raes et al., 2006; Moore, Watts, & 
Williams, 1988; Watkins, Grimm, Whitney, & Brown, 2005; Watts, 1995; Watts & Sharrock, 1985). 
As with attention problems, these memory deficits are thought to be resolved when the underlying 
depressive disorder has been treated (Karasu et al., 2000). However, to date it is unknown whether 
memory deficits also play a causal role in depression – though given the interconnectedness of 
attention and memory processes (Cowan, 1995), and the finding that basic attention processes could 
play a causal role in depression, this remains a distinct possibility. 
Given previous research suggesting that depression, boredom, attention, and memory are all 
theoretically and empirically linked, the present research seeks to examine the relations between 
one‟s propensity to experience cognitive problems, such as attention lapses and memory failures, and 
one‟s proneness to experience boredom and depression. To assess the propensity to experience 
attention lapses and memory failures, respectively, I modified the Mindful Attention Awareness Scale 
(MAAS; Brown & Ryan, 2003), to become the MAAS-LO (See Method below), and also made a 
revised version of the Memory Failures Scale (MFS; Cheyne et al., 2006). To address the relations 
between these attention and memory deficits and affective dysfunction, boredom was measured via 
the Boredom Proneness Scale (BPS; Farmer & Sundberg, 1986) and depression via a scale that 
closely follows the diagnostic criteria for depression in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, version 
4 (DSM-IV; American Psychiatric Association, 1994), the Beck Depression Inventory – Second 
Edition (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996). I also included a revision of the Attention-Related 
Cognitive Errors Scale (ARCES), allowing further examination of the possibility that the occurrence 
of everyday cognitive errors in both depression and boredom can be explained by disruptions of basic 
cognitive mechanisms. 
Based on evidence supporting the assumption that one‟s propensity to experience attention lapses is 
an important factor in boredom and depression, and that memory failures also play an important role, 
 
 8 
I predict the MAAS-LO and MFS will explain a significant amount of the variance in the BPS and 
BDI-II. The ARCES, however, is hypothesized to act primarily as a partial mediator between the 
MAAS-LO and MFS, so the ARCES itself should not explain a significant amount of the variance in 
the BPS or BDI-II once the MAAS-LO and MFS are accounted for. To examine the hypothesis that 
failures of basic cognitive mechanisms represent an important contributor to boredom proneness and 
depression, I conducted a path analysis using structural equation modeling (Arbuckle, 2005) with the 
MAAS-LO as a common cause of all other variables, and the MFS mediating the associations 
between the MAAS-LO, BPS and BDI-II. Within the path analysis, several additional hypotheses 
were also addressed regarding the relations among the MAAS-LO, MFS, BPS and BDI-II. In 
particular, I assessed an alternative hypothesis in which the MAAS-LO and MFS are modeled as 
consequences of the BPS and BDI-II. Additionally, the BPS and BDI-II were each modeled 
separately as common causes of cognitive outcomes. 
1.2 Method 
1.2.1 Participants 
Participants were 298 undergraduates enrolled in an Introductory Psychology course at the University 
of Waterloo who completed all five of the questionnaires below, while leaving no more than two 
responses blank for each questionnaire. The study was conducted online, as part of the initial mass 
testing battery completed each term. Demographic information is not available for his sample. 
Participants received bonus course credit as compensation for completing the questionnaires. 
1.2.2 Measures 
Included with the scales of interest were several samples of the general online assessments associated 
with Introductory Psychology courses. Participants were not aware of the relatedness of the scales 
and, while their presentation was not fully counterbalanced, the questionnaires were provided to 
participants in one of three random orders. These orderings allowed a good balance to the distribution 
of the questionnaires overall. Participants‟ mean item scores were calculated for each questionnaire in 
order to accommodate occasional response omissions. 
The 15-item Mindful Attention Awareness Scale (MAAS; Brown & Ryan, 2003) was selected as a 
measure of attention lapses. MAAS items ask about mindlessness in everyday situations and, using a 
Likert scale ranging from almost never (1) to almost always (6), responses indicating greater 
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frequency indicate less mindfulness. Several minor adjustments are required in order to effectively 
use the MAAS as a measure of attention lapses. Two items on the MAAS (items 2 and 6) actually 
refer to consequences of attention failures and were therefore removed. In addition, one item (item 
12) references attention lapses while driving, a situation not commonly experienced for a large 
proportion of university students, and was removed to increase the general applicability of the scale. 
Thus, I used a revised version of the MAAS including only the 12 items referring directly to attention 
lapses, which is now called the Mindful Attention Awareness Scale - Lapses Only (MAAS-LO). In 
addition, because the MAAS-LO is interpreted as a measure of attention lapses, I do not reverse score 
its items, as is conventional for the original MAAS (see Cheyne et al., 2006, for further discussion of 
this issue). The MAAS-LO has a minimum score of 12 (infrequent attentional lapses) and a maximum 
score of 72 (very frequent attentional lapses). 
The Attention-Related Cognitive Errors Scale (ARCES; Cheyne et al., 2006) was incorporated as 
an additional assessment of attentional impairment. The ARCES measures the frequency with which 
one experiences a variety of everyday behavioural and cognitive failures, for which an attention lapse 
is the most likely cause. In an effort to continue to improve the ARCES several adjustments were 
made. One question (item 4: "I have found myself wearing mismatched socks or other apparel") stood 
out as being substantially less related to the overall scale and was replaced with a question referring to 
the inability to follow a conversation (see item 3 of Appendix A). As well, two questions (originally 
items 3 and 5, see Appendix A) received minor wording changes in order to make them more 
generally applicable. The revised ARCES continues to be a 12-item questionnaire employing a Likert 
scale of five possible responses, ranging from never (1) to very often (5), with a minimum score of 12 
and a maximum score of 60. 
The 12-item Memory Failures Scale (MFS; Cheyne et al., 2006) was included as a measure of 
everyday memory failures that are minimally explained by attentional errors. The MFS includes items 
such as “Even though I put things in a special place I still forget where they are,” and follows a Likert 
scale ranging from never (1) to very often (5), with a minimum score of 12 and a maximum score of 
60. For the present study two questions were replaced from the original MFS (item 1: "I leave 
important letters/emails unanswered for days"; item 12: "When I go to introduce my friends I forget 
their names") for being too causally ambiguous and to reduce overlap between items. Items from the 
revised MFS appear in Appendix B. 
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The propensity to become bored was assessed via the 28-item Boredom Proneness Scale (BPS; 
Farmer & Sundberg, 1986), as it reflects situations in which we are likely to become bored (e.g., 
“Much of the time I just sit around doing nothing”) and related personal characteristics of boredom 
(e.g., “I would like more challenging things to do in life”). The BPS uses a Likert scale ranging from 
strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7), with a neutral (4) midpoint. The BPS has a minimum 
score of 28 and a maximum score of 196. 
As a measure of depression I included the second edition of the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-
II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996), a 21-item scale that addresses the diagnostic criteria for depression 
in the DSM-IV (American Psychiatric Association, 1994). The BDI-II has a minimum score of 0 and 
a maximum score of 63, requiring participants to select from a list of statements relevant to 
depression the one that best describes how they have been feeling throughout the last two weeks. 
1.3 Results 
Consistent with earlier findings (Cheyne et al., 2006), the revised ARCES and MFS were found to 
have good distributional and psychometric properties. There was a good range of scores, no 
significant deviations from normality in skewness and kurtosis, and there was a very satisfactory 
internal consistency (Table 1.1). The items of the revised ARCES and MFS all had good item-total 
correlations (see Appendixes A and B; see also Appendixes C and D for additional psychometric data 
for the ARCES and MFS). The MAAS-LO also had good distributional and psychometric properties, 
with a good range of scores, no deviations from normality in skewness and kurtosis, and very 
satisfactory internal consistency (Table 1.1). The BPS was characterized by some minor skewness 
and kurtosis, a good range of scores, and good internal consistency. The BDI-II alone was 
characterized by more significant skewness and kurtosis, although this is not atypical of an 
undergraduate student population. 
Pearson Product-Moment correlation coefficients are presented in Table 1.2. All coefficients are 
moderate to large. As predicted, the ARCES, MAAS-LO, and the MFS were positively correlated. 
Furthermore, as predicted, both attention measures and the MFS were associated with the BPS and 


































































































































































































































































































  12 
 
Table 1.2. Pearson Product-Moment Correlations of All Measures (N = 298) 
 
 
ARCES MFS BPS BDI-II 
     
Mindful Awareness of Attention – Lapses Only .47 .48 .42 .40 
Attention-Related Cognitive Errors  .61 .33 .28 
Memory Failures   .44 .39 
Boredom Proneness    .45 
Beck Depression Inventory – II     
 
Note. For all coefficients, p < .001. 
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To further assess the previous finding of Cheyne and colleagues (2006) that the ARCES mediates 
the association between the MAAS-LO and MFS, a step-wise multiple regression analysis was 
conducted (Table 1.3). At step two, when the ARCES was added, the beta weight for the MAAS-LO 
was substantially reduced, but remained significant, indicating a substantial, though partial, mediation 
of the relation between the MAAS-LO and MFS via the ARCES. Thus, I again find attention lapses 
are strongly associated with memory failures, though a substantial portion of this relation is due to the 
attention-related cognitive errors also resulting from attention lapses. The corroboration of this 
previous finding in the current results plays an important role in my subsequent structural equation 
models, because the finding that the ARCES mediates the relation between the MAAS-LO and MFS 
substantially constrains the number of potential models to be examined. Accordingly, all of the 
hypotheses to be tested were developed as an extension of this previous finding and were designed to 




Table 1.3. Step-wise Multiple Regression Testing for Mediation of Memory Failures (MFS) and 
Mindful Awareness of Attention (MAAS-LO) by Attention-Related Cognitive Errors (ARCES) 
 
Dependent Variable: MFS 
 
β t p 
Step 1    
   MAAS-LO   .48 9.34 .001 
Step 2    
   MAAS-LO  .25 4.89 .001 
   ARCES .50 9.91 .001 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         




To assess the hypothesis that the association of boredom proneness with attention-related cognitive 
errors is mediated by basic attention and memory failures, a step-wise multiple regression analysis 
(Table 1.4) was conducted. In this analysis, with the BPS as the dependent variable, the ARCES was 
significantly associated with the BPS in step one. In step two, when the MAAS-LO was added, the 
beta weight for the ARCES was reduced but remained significant. In step three the MFS was added. 
Although both the MFS and MAAS-LO remained significant, the beta for the ARCES was very small 
and no longer significant. This regression analysis was repeated for each of the three random 
questionnaire orders, each showing a reduction in the association between the ARCES and BPS, 
suggesting the order of the questionnaires did not play a significant role in this association. Thus, the 
present analysis indicates the bivariate association between the ARCES and BPS is almost entirely 
accounted for by the MAAS-LO and MFS, suggesting that attention-related cognitive errors and 
boredom proneness are related only to the extent that they are both closely related to lapses of 
attention and memory failures. 
A parallel analysis was conducted with the BDI-II as the dependent variable, with very similar 
results (Table 1.5). Once again, the MAAS-LO and MFS substantially reduced the contribution of the 
ARCES, effectively eliminating the association between the ARCES and BDI-II. This analysis was 
again repeated for each of the three random questionnaire orders, with each showing a reduction in 
the association between the ARCES and BDI-II, again suggesting questionnaire order had little effect. 
Thus, the present analysis indicates the bivariate association between the ARCES and BDI-II is 
entirely accounted for by the MAAS-LO and MFS. Therefore, as with boredom proneness, the data 
suggest attention-related cognitive errors and depression are associated only via their shared relations 





Table 1.4. Step-wise Multiple Regression Testing for Mediation of Attention-Related Cognitive 
Errors (ARCES) and Boredom Proneness (BPS) by Mindful Awareness of Attention (MAAS-LO) and 
Memory Failures (MFS) 
 
Dependent Variable: BPS 
 
β t p 
Step 1    
   ARCES   .33 5.93 .001 
Step 2    
   ARCES  .17 2.82 .005 
   MAAS-LO .34 5.80 .001 
Step 3    
   ARCES  .02 0.24 .81 
   MAAS-LO .27 4.51 .001 
   MFS  .30 4.57 .001 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              




Table 1.5. Step-Wise Multiple Regression Testing for Mediation of Attention-Related Failures 
(ARCES) and Beck Depression (BDI-II) by Mindful Awareness of Attention (MAAS-LO) and Memory 
Failures (MFS) 
 
Dependent Variable: BDI-II 
 
β t p 
Step 1    
   ARCES   .28 5.06 .001 
Step 2    
   ARCES  .12 2.01 .045 
   MAAS-LO .35 5.78 .001 
Step 3    
   ARCES  -.01 0.11 .915 
   MAAS-LO .28 4.65 .001 
   MFS  .26 3.78 .001 
  




A number of hypotheses regarding the causal relations between our measures were tested via path 
analyses using structural equation modeling (Arbuckle, 2005). As specifying a causal direction 
between the BPS and BDI-II does not impact model fit for the models I will discuss, the relation 
between the BPS and BDI-II could be represented either causally or as a simple correlation without 
affecting how well the model fit the data. Of primary interest was the initial hypothesis that everyday 
attention lapses and memory failures play causal roles in the onset of boredom and depression; hence, 
my first model was an Attention-to-Affect model designed to assess this hypothesis. Several 
alternative hypotheses were also tested using parallel models. First, to address the hypothesis that 
affective dysfunction is a cause of failures in basic cognitive mechanisms, rather than an outcome of 
these failures, I developed an Affect-to-Attention model in which boredom proneness and depression 
together predict the propensity to experience attention lapses and memory failures. Next, I examined 
the hypothesis that only depression plays a causal role in boredom, attention lapses and memory 
failures but that these cognitive failures still played a causal role in boredom proneness. Finally, I 
modified this model so that boredom proneness instead played a causal role in depression, attention 
lapses and memory failures, with cognitive failures in turn also predicting depression. 
The Attention-to-Affect model assessed the simultaneous effects of the MAAS-LO and MFS on the 
BPS and BDI-II, using the MAAS-LO as an exogenous variable predicting the ARCES, MFS, BPS 
and BDI-II. Consistent with earlier regression analyses and initial hypotheses, the MFS was also 
entered as a partial mediator of the effect of the MAAS-LO on the BPS and BDI-II, and the ARCES 
was entered as a partial mediator of the effect of the MAAS-LO on the MFS. As discussed in the 
Introduction, the inability to maintain attention is a particularly compelling feature of boredom and on 
this basis I elected to represent the relation between the BPS and BDI-II causally for this model. The 
final model is presented in Figure 1.1; this model provided very good fit indices for the data, χ
2
 (2, N 
= 298) = 0.09, p = .956, CFI = 1.00, NFI = 1.00, RMSEA = .00, consistent with my initial hypothesis 
that failures of basic cognitive mechanisms can play a causal role in affective dysfunction. Thus, the 
analyses support the conclusion that an initial propensity toward attention lapses is likely to lead one 
to experience more frequent attention-related cognitive errors (e.g., failing to see a desired object 
despite looking directly at it) and memory failures (e.g., forgetting appointments), and can also lead 




Figure 1.1. Final path model with significant path coefficients for self-reported attention (MAAS-LO, 
ARCES) and memory (MFS) failures and Boredom Proneness (BPS) and Beck Depression (BDI-II). 






















The alternative Affect-to-Attention model, in which the BPS and BDI-II together predict both the 
MAAS-LO and MFS, and with the MAAS-LO mediating the relations between the BPS, BDI-II and 
ARCES (Figure 1.2), provided much poorer fit indices for the data, χ
2
 (2, N = 298) = 9.15, p = .010, 
CFI = .98, NFI = .98, RMSEA = .11). It was not possible to directly test the significance of the 
difference between these models, however, as the models are not nested. The alternative model with 
the best fit for the data was one in which only the causal associations from the MAAS-LO to the BDI-
II, from the MFS to the BDI-II, and from the BPS to the BDI-II were reversed from the model 
represented in Figure 1.1, to assess the hypothesis that associations with all cognitive variables were 
the result of the BDI-II rather than the MAAS-LO. However, though the chi-square was not 
significant, this proved again to be a substantially poorer model (χ
2
 (2, N = 298) = 4.13, p = .127, CFI 
= .99, NFI = .99, RMSEA = .06) than the model presented in Figure 1.1. A related model in which the 
BPS was selected as the only exogenous variable, predicting the MAAS-LO and MFS, was equally 
poor, yielding a significant χ
2
 (2, N = 298) = 7.91, p = .019, CFI = .99, NFI = .98, RMSEA = .10. The 
poorer fit of these models suggest the data best support the notion that failures of basic cognitive 





Figure 1.2. Alternative path model with significant path coefficients for self-reported Boredom 
Proneness (BPS) and Beck Depression (BDI-II) predicting attention (MAAS-LO, ARCES) and 




















It was possible to improve all the alternative models by including one more parameter linking the 
BDI-II or BPS with the ARCES. However, these models approached saturation, allowing only one 
degree of freedom, and so sacrifice substantial parsimony in order to improve model fit. Again, as 
these models are not nested, a direct statistical comparison was not possible, but clearly the model 
best and most parsimoniously fitting the data is the Attention-to-Affect model, shown in Figure 1.1, 
in which the MAAS-LO predicts all cognitive and affective variables, with the MFS mediating the 
relations between the MAAS-LO, BPS and BDI-II. The alternative models could also be improved by 
reversing the causal direction between the MFS and ARCES, such that the ARCES no longer 
mediated the association between the MAAS-LO and MFS, as this modification allowed the relation 
between the ARCES and BPS to be mediated by the MFS. Although this modification accounts for 
the necessary mediation of the association between the ARCES and BPS, I do not believe the 
modification is theoretically defensible. Accordingly, my preferred model remains the Attention-to-
Affect model as it is also able to account for the ARCES, BPS mediation while remaining consistent 
with cognitive theories and current and previous (Cheyne et al., 2006) findings of a partial mediation 
of the association between the MAAS-LO and MFS via the ARCES. 
1.4 Discussion 
Consistent with initial hypotheses that attention lapses and memory failures mediate the association of 
attention-related cognitive failures with boredom proneness and depression, regression analyses 
showed the MAAS-LO and MFS accounted for virtually all of the shared variance between the 
ARCES and the BPS as well as the BDI-II. The finding with regard to the BPS replicates an earlier 
finding (Cheyne et al., 2006) and is consistent with other previous findings of associations of the BPS 
with cognitive failures more generally (Wallace et al., 2002; Wallace et al., 2003). In a previous study 
(Cheyne et al., 2006) the MFS was also found to be strongly associated with the ARCES, suggesting 
that attention–related cognitive errors might contribute to memory failures, partially mediating the 
relation between attention lapses and memory failures. The present regression results continue to 
support this mediation hypothesis, which is an important feature in the subsequent structural equation 
models as this assumption substantially reduced the number of potential models to be examined. 
Given the strong evidence that the MAAS-LO and MFS mediate associations between the BPS, 
BDI-II and ARCES I eliminated direct paths between the BPS and BDI-II with ARCES in subsequent 
structural models. An Attention-to-Affect model, with attention lapses as a common cause of all other 
variables and with memory failures as a partial mediator between attention lapses and affective 
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dysfunction, provided a well-fitting model for the data (Figure 1.1). Moreover, it was not possible to 
improve on this model without adding parameters. No causal assumptions were necessary with regard 
to the relation between the BPS and BDI-II, as the direction of this association did not impact model 
fit. Nonetheless, for this model I chose to use the BPS as a predictor of the BDI-II given the strong 
attentional component of boredom identified in the Introduction; however, this decision had no effect 
on the fit of the model to the data and reflects only a preference for seeing boredom as playing a 
causal role in the onset of depression, while also allowing this preference to serve as guide for 
potential future models of the attention–affect relation. 
A parallel Affect-to-Attention model, treating the BDI-II and BPS as common causes of the 
MAAS-LO and MFS, was much less satisfactory than the Attention-to-Affect model, providing 
further support for the notion that everyday attention lapses and memory failures can be good causal 
predictors of affective dysfunction. Similar alternative models that treated either the BDI-II or BPS as 
a common cause of the MAAS-LO and MFS were also much less satisfactory. The major problem 
with all these parallel models was that they required a direct link of the BDI-II or BPS to the ARCES, 
despite regression analyses suggesting no such link should be necessary. Furthermore, it is unclear 
how depression and boredom could bypass attention lapses to directly influence the attention-related 
cognitive errors that are measured by the ARCES. As an alternative method of resolving the poor fit 
of these models for the data, the causal link between the ARCES and MFS could be reversed such 
that the ARCES no longer mediates the relation between the MAAS-LO and MFS. This adjustment 
resolves the need for a direct link between the BPS and ARCES as their association is then mediated 
by the MFS. Unfortunately, it is unclear how memory failures could play a causal role in the 
attention-related cognitive errors measured by the ARCES. Thus, modeling the MAAS-LO as the 
common cause of all other variables (Figure 1.1) appears to be at least more parsimonious than 
modeling the BDI-II or BPS as the common cause of the MAAS-LO and MFS. This outcome is 
consistent with literature reviewed in the Introduction observing that conventional treatments for 
depression tend to employ methods that provide coping mechanisms for dealing with difficulty 
sustaining attention in everyday situations. 
Although correlational data cannot provide definitive knowledge about causation, the benefit of 
structural equation modeling is that it allows us to predict experimental outcomes in advance of a 
longitudinal study. The results obtained in the present study suggest a clear need for additional 
research on the potential long-term consequences of relatively small lapses of basic attention and 
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memory processes.  While there is a growing literature suggesting attention failures can be costly in 
terms of human error (e.g., Borrell-Carrió & Epstein, 2004; Robertson, 2003), the present results 
suggest future research should also consider costs in terms of personal well-being.  
In contrast to the traditional view of the interaction between attention and affect, the present 
findings suggest attention training might eliminate a major source of affective dysfunction in general, 
and thereby lead to a reduction in other symptoms of negative affect that are dependant on everyday 
cognitive failures. Therefore, attempts to treat primarily, or even solely, the cognitive problems 
underlying the onset of depression could be expected to achieve reasonable success. Indeed, this is the 
behavioural, if not motivational, focus of Wells‟ attention training therapy (ATT; Wells, 1990), and 
so such techniques may provide a direct manipulation of the basic cognitive deficits underlying the 
maladaptive thought control strategies responsible for depression; thus providing an important first 
step in both overcoming depression and reducing the likelihood of depressive relapse. 
As a related matter of interest, neuroimaging studies have indicated a link between memory and 
emotion in the retrosplenial cortex (Maddock, 1999). Such findings not only support the present 
conclusions, but also provide a good starting point for future research on the causal role of memory 
failures in affective dysfunction. Similarly, a recent study of the brain areas active during mind 
wandering (Mason et al., 2007) suggests a “default network” of cortical areas which could be 
examined further in future studies of the effects of mind wandering on one‟s affective state. Using 
these studies as a basis for future research could allow the neural underpinnings of the causal role of 
basic cognitive mechanisms in affective state to be more easily discovered, and may provide valuable 
insight into new treatment methods for affective dysfunction. 
Consistent with previous findings (Cheyne et al., 2006), the present results again suggest 
momentary lapses of attention can lead to a variety of cognitive errors. Moreover, in conjunction with 
their subsequent and concurrent memory failures, such attention lapses may causally influence our 
affective well-being. In contrast to most theories of the role of cognitive deficits in depression, the 
present findings are compatible with a re-conception of the potential causal importance of attention 
and memory deficits in depression and affective disorders in general. Similarly, the present results 
suggest these same attention and memory failures are important contributors to the experience of 
boredom, namely the ability to sustain interest and engagement with the environment. It seems 
reasonable that boredom proneness, in turn, may be a potential contributor to the development of 
dysphoric states and depression. Thus, on the whole, the present study provides compelling evidence 
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that a conscious awareness of our actions is an important contributor to the effectiveness of even 






Attention-Related Cognitive Failures and Perceived Self-Efficacy 
2.1 Introduction 
Absentminded lapses of attention are a common event in our daily lives. Although these lapses are 
generally taken to be rather trivial, they can nonetheless also have dramatic and life-threatening 
consequences. Indeed, absentmindedness may have been the primary cause of a recent major 
commuter train crash near Chatsworth, California when an engineer became too focused on sending 
text messages from his cell phone to either notice or respond to operating signals telling him he 
should stop the train (National Transportation Safety Board, 2008). Such examples highlight the 
dramatic consequences that disruptions in attention can have when they occur at inopportune 
moments, but, given the pervasiveness and ubiquity of attention lapses in everyday life, their 
cumulative effects may also hold the potential for other serious and less obvious consequences. In 
making this argument in the previous chapter I presented data supporting the hypothesis that mundane 
episodes of inattention, and their resulting cognitive and behavioural errors, are a potential cause of 
boredom and depression. The present chapter develops this argument further and tests the hypothesis 
that the influences of everyday inattention on boredom and depression are mediated, in part, by the 
effects of inattention on one‟s general perceived self-efficacy. 
To examine the potential causal influence of inattention on boredom and depression, in Chapter 1 I 
conducted a large scale questionnaire study and used structural equation modeling to test and 
compare the statistical properties of two hypotheses: (1) that nonspecific basic cognitive failures in 
attention and memory are an initial cause of boredom proneness and depression; and (2) the reverse, 
that boredom proneness and depression cause nonspecific attention and memory failures. The first, 
Attention-to-Affect hypothesis  (that everyday inattention has potential long-term emotional 
consequences) was compared to the second, Affect-to-Attention hypothesis (the traditional view that 
affective states influence cognitive function). To evaluate these hypotheses each model was compared 
against the null hypothesis, addressing the question of whether either model was capable of 
explaining the observed correlation among the relevant variables. Although allowing only indirect 
comparison between the models, this method has the potential to evaluate the respective ability of 
each model to reject the null. These analyses showed only the Attention-to-Affect model, modeling 
attention lapses and associated failures as the common cause of memory failures, boredom, and 
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depression, provided good fit for the data. Further analyses are still required, however, to determine 
additional mediating mechanisms through which simple and innocuous attention failures lead to 
complex affective states like depression. 
One way for attention lapses to potentially influence our future affective state is through our sense 
of self-efficacy; that is, our judgement about our ability to successfully achieve our goals – usually in 
reference to a specific situation or activity (Bandura, 1977). Our sense of self-efficacy reflects both 
the expectation that we are capable of performing a task and the expectation that most others are not 
substantially more capable of performing the same task (Davis & Yates, 1982). For example, if I 
happen to believe I am an excellent ballroom dancer (reflecting a horribly erroneous sense of self-
efficacy in that domain) then I would enrol in, and expect to outperform others in, an upcoming 
ballroom dance competition. Aside from specific domains, it is also possible to hold beliefs about our 
general ability to perform everyday tasks and even cope with novel challenges, perhaps through 
extrapolation from past experiences tackling unforeseen problems. Such beliefs reflect a generalized 
sense of self-efficacy (Tipton & Worthington, 1984), but could be undermined in the face of frequent 
attention lapses chronically interfering with our ability to perform even simple everyday tasks. 
Reduced self-efficacy is associated with a tendency to view one‟s failures as the result of an 
inherent lack of ability rather than focusing more on situational factors or attributing them simply to 
insufficient effort (Bandura, 1997). The parallels between such beliefs and the counterproductive, 
negative affect-laden, biases of both boredom and depression are consistent with, and may even 
explain, Bandura‟s claim that depression is a potential outcome of decreased self-efficacy. In 
particular, if through our sense of inefficacy we come to believe our successes are the result of luck 
and failures represent our actual ability, depression will result in part because we devalue our 
accomplishments and overvalue our failures. Thus, reduced self-efficacy is thought to create 
cognitive biases that produce depression and could also potentially influence attention by continually 
directing it away from information that may be critical to successful task completion. Furthermore, 
since our sense of self-efficacy is relative to the ability of others, depression, and an unwillingness to 
even attempt tasks, is an especially likely result when we expect others would not have difficulty 
completing the same tasks with which we have had trouble (Davis & Yates, 1982). Ultimately this 
process suggests that even when initial failures are replaced with later successes we may still be less 
likely to engage in similar behaviour again. Furthermore, if those failures are very frequent in regular, 
everyday, activities, that we know are not problematic for most people, it follows that we may 
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eventually disengage from everyday behaviour in general, and become bored or depressed  even 
without being able to later point to one major cause. From this point, it is only a small role reversal to 
suggest the frequent attention lapses that interfere in task success could in fact precede reductions in 
self-efficacy. In this way, attention lapses that disrupt everyday activities and lead to repeated failures 
may put in jeopardy our sense of self-efficacy and lead to boredom and depression. 
Given previous observations that attention, self-efficacy, boredom, and depression are all 
theoretically and empirically linked, the present research again applied the Attention-to-Affect 
hypothesis of Chapter 1 to elucidate more precisely the structure of these relations. In particular, I 
sought to evaluate the potential causal flow from attentional errors – specifically attention lapses and 
subsequent attention-related errors – to a proneness to experience boredom and depression. This 
causal flow is consistent with findings from MacLeod and colleagues (MacLeod, Rutherford, 
Campbell, Ebsworthy, & Holker, 2002), but contrasts with the traditional view of how emotion and 
attention are linked. Indeed, although not often articulated as a concrete hypothesis, the more 
common perspective is that emotions influence attention. This appears to be the received view, for 
example, in most research on attentional biases in anxiety and depression (e.g., Dalgleish & Watts, 
1990; Gotlib, McLachlan, & Katz, 1988; MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986; Mogg, Bradley, & 
Williams, 1995; Smallwood, 2004; see also a review in Ingram, Steidtmann, & Bistricky, 2008) and 
on the attentional effects of encountering emotionally salient information (e.g., biases toward negative 
emotions; Fenske & Eastwood, 2003), although, with respect to the latter, it is worth noting that 
attention has been shown to have reciprocal effects on the later emotional evaluation of stimuli 
(Fenske & Raymond, 2006). 
2.2 The Present Study 
To examine the hypothesis that perceived self-efficacy mediates the association between failures of 
basic cognitive mechanisms and affective distress (boredom proneness and depression), I conducted a 
path analysis using structural equation modeling in AMOS (Arbuckle, 2005) to examine the relations 
between five self-report questionnaires. Frequency of attention lapses and associated cognitive errors 
were assessed via the Mindful Attention Awareness Scale–Lapses Only and the Attention-Related 
Cognitive Errors Scale (MAAS-LO and ARCES; Carriere et al., 2008). Boredom was assessed via the 
Boredom Proneness Scale (BPS; Farmer & Sundberg, 1986) and depression via the Beck Depression 
Inventory – Second Edition (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996). Self-efficacy was measured via 
the Generalized Self Efficacy scale (GSE; Schwarzer & Jerusalem, 1995). Based on previous findings  
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and the present arguments, I predicted the MAAS-LO would explain a significant amount of the 
variance in the BPS and BDI-II, while the ARCES would function as a mediator between the MAAS-
LO and GSE, such that the ARCES would not explain a significant amount of the variance in the BPS 
and BDI-II once relations with the MAAS-LO and GSE were accounted for. Several additional 
hypotheses were examined to address alternative theories about the relations among the MAAS-LO, 
GSE, BPS and BDI-II. In particular, I evaluated the more traditional Affect-to-Attention hypothesis 
that negative affect creates cognitive biases which influence attention (e.g., through reduction of 
attentional capacity by rumination) and our perceived self-efficacy. I also assessed an additional 
alternative hypothesis based on Bandura‟s work, which would predict that self-efficacy is the 
common cause of cognitive deficits and biases influencing both attention and affect. 
2.3 Method 
2.3.1 Participants 
Participants were from an international sample of 184 respondents who completed all five of the 
questionnaires below via an attention lapse research website, http://oops.uwaterloo.ca. Participants 
included in the analyses completed all five questionnaires and had no more than two missing 
responses for each questionnaire; 140 participants had zero missing responses. Participants received 
no compensation for completing the questionnaires, aside from the information already available to 
them on our website. Not all participants opted to provide demographic information and given that 
this study was conducted online I have no information for these participants beyond their 
questionnaire responses. Of those participants who provided demographic information, there were 84 
males and 94 females with a mean age of 35.95 (SD = 13.38; n = 174). 
2.3.2 Measures 
After first receiving the initial demographics questionnaire, the five questionnaires below were 
completed in random order across participants. In addition, the individual items within each 
questionnaire were randomly ordered, such that no two participants were likely to receive the same 
ordering of questionnaires and items. To accommodate occasional missing responses, item mean 
scores were calculated by averaging across the responses provided. 
The 12-item Mindful Attention Awareness Scale–Lapses Only (MAAS-LO; Chapter 1) was 
selected as the measure of attention lapses. MAAS-LO items, such as “I find it difficult to stay 
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focused on what‟s happening in the present,” ask about mindless behaviour in everyday situations 
using a six-point Likert scale ranging from almost never (1) to almost always (6). Responses 
indicating a greater frequency suggest a greater propensity toward everyday attention lapses. Aside 
from removal of three items, and the scale being direct-scored rather than reverse-scored, the MAAS-
LO is identical to the MAAS originally developed by Brown & Ryan (2003). 
A revised version of the Attention-Related Cognitive Errors Scale (ARCES; Cheyne et al., 2006) 
was incorporated as an assessment of notable cognitive and behavioural outcomes of attention lapses. 
The revised ARCES (Chapter 1) is a 12-item questionnaire measuring the frequency with which one 
experiences a variety of cognitive failures, for example: “I have absent-mindedly misplaced 
frequently used objects, such as keys, pens, glasses, etc.” The ARCES employs a five-point Likert 
scale from never (1) to very often (5). 
The 10-item General Self-Efficacy scale (GSE; Schwarzer & Jerusalem, 1995) was selected as a 
measure of one‟s perceived self-efficacy. The GSE includes items such as “I can always manage to 
solve difficult problems if I try hard enough” and “I am confident that I could deal efficiently with 
unexpected events,” to index self-efficacy and uses a four-point Likert scale ranging from not at all 
true (1) to exactly true (4). 
Boredom was measured via the Boredom Proneness Scale (BPS; Farmer & Sundberg, 1986). The 
28-item BPS reflects situations in which we are likely to become bored (e.g., “Having to look at 
someone‟s home movies or travel slides bores me tremendously”) and related characteristics of 
boredom (e.g., “Time always seems to be passing slowly”). The BPS uses a Likert scale ranging from 
strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7), with a neutral (4) midpoint. 
As in Chapter 1, I used the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II; Beck et al., 1996) to measure 
depression. The BDI-II is a 21-item scale that addresses the diagnostic criteria for depression outlined 
in the DSM-IV (American Psychiatric Association, 1994). The BDI-II asks participants to select from 
a list of statements the one that best describes how they have been feeling throughout the last two 
weeks. Accordingly, the BDI-II includes statements such as “I am so sad or unhappy that I can‟t stand 
it” to indicate depression, and related normal mood statements such as “I don‟t criticize or blame 
myself more than usual.” 
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2.4 Results and Discussion 
Consistent with earlier findings (Chapter 1; Cheyne et al., 2006), the ARCES and MAAS-LO were 
found to have good distributional and psychometric properties. All measures showed a good range of 
scores, no significant deviations from normality in skewness and kurtosis, and demonstrated very 
satisfactory internal consistency (Table 2.1). 
Pearson Product-Moment correlation coefficients are presented in Table 2.2. All coefficients are 
moderate to large. As predicted, the ARCES and MAAS-LO were positively correlated, and both 
were negatively correlated with the GSE. Furthermore, as predicted, the GSE was also associated 
with the BPS and BDI-II. Overall, the correlations between attentional and mood measures replicated 
my previous findings (Chapter 1). 
Once again, my initial hypothesis was that attention lapses (here measured via the MAAS-LO) 
would influence our general sense of self-efficacy primarily through their impact on our ability to 
perform everyday tasks (measured via the ARCES). Thus, to address the question of whether the 
ARCES mediates the association between the MAAS-LO and GSE, a step-wise multiple regression 
analysis was conducted (Table 2.3). At step two, when the ARCES was added, the beta weight for the 
MAAS-LO was considerably reduced and lost significance, indicating a substantial mediation of the 
relation between the MAAS-LO and GSE via the ARCES. This suggests that one‟s everyday 
inattention leads to a decreased sense of self-efficacy primarily through the attention-related cognitive 
errors that also result from attention lapses. Accordingly, when modeling the ability of self-efficacy to 
mediate the relation between inattention and emotional distress, no direct connection should be 
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Table 2.2. Pearson Product-Moment Correlations of All Measures (N = 184) 
 
 
ARCES GSE BPS BDI-II 
     
Mindful Awareness of Attention – Lapses Only .66 -.21  .56  .55 
Attention-Related Cognitive Errors  -.29  .50  .48 
Generalized Self-Efficacy   -.41 -.49 
Boredom Proneness     .64 
Beck Depression Inventory – II     
 




Table 2.3. Step-wise Multiple Regression Testing for Mediation of Generalized Self-Efficacy (GSE) 
and Attention Lapses (MAAS-LO) by Attention-Related Cognitive Errors (ARCES) 
 
Dependent Variable: GSE 
 
β t p 
Step 1    
   MAAS-LO -.22 2.97 .003 
Step 2    
   MAAS-LO -.03 0.30 .762 
   ARCES -.28 2.98 .003 
  
Final Model R = .30, F (2,181) = 9.05, p < .001 
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My primary interest was in extending our knowledge about the role that everyday attention lapses 
play in the onset of boredom and depression. Hence, an SEM was constructed based on the theory-
driven hypotheses that 1) attention lapses (measured via the MAAS-LO) would influence our general 
sense of self-efficacy (measured via the GSE) primarily through their impact on our ability to perform 
everyday tasks (measured via the ARCES), and 2) the association of boredom proneness (measured 
via the BPS) and depression (measured via the BDI-II) with everyday task errors is mediated by self-
efficacy. A second and more traditional Affect-to-Attention hypothesis reversed these predictions, 
producing a model in which boredom and depression predict attention lapses and self-efficacy. In 
addition, I tested an alternative model based on Bandura‟s (1997) assertion that decreased self-
efficacy would produce cognitive changes that have both attentional and emotional effects. 
The Attention-to-Affect model assessed the simultaneous effects of the MAAS-LO and GSE on the 
BPS and BDI-II, using the MAAS-LO as an exogenous variable predicting the ARCES, GSE, BPS 
and BDI-II. Consistent with the present regression analyses, the GSE was also entered as a partial 
mediator of the effect of the MAAS-LO on the BPS and BDI-II, and the ARCES was entered as a 
mediator of the effect of the MAAS-LO on the GSE. This model, presented in Figure 2.1, provided 
very good fit indices for the data, χ
2
 (3, N = 184) = 4.34, p = .227, CFI = .996, NFI = .988, RMSEA = 




Figure 2.1. Predicted Attention-to-Affect path model with path coefficients for self-reported attention 
(via MAAS-LO, ARCES) and self-efficacy (via GSE) measures predicting boredom proneness (via 





















The Affect-to-Attention model, in which the BPS and BDI-II were treated as correlated exogenous 
variables that jointly predict both the MAAS-LO and GSE, and with the MAAS-LO mediating the 
relations between the BPS, BDI-II and ARCES, is shown in Figure 2.2. As the Affect-to-Attention 
model that implicitly directs most research would not specifically predict a direct influence of self-
efficacy on attention-related errors, without influencing attention lapses first, the direction of the path 
between the ARCES and GSE remains consistent with the model shown in Figure 2.1. This model 
provided much poorer fit indices for the data, χ
2
 (3, N = 184) = 15.47, p = .002, CFI = .964, NFI = 
.957, RMSEA = .151, BCC = 40.28, though it was not possible to directly test the significance of the 
difference between this model and the Attention-to-Affect model as they are not nested. Nonetheless, 
this model, which most closely matches the conventional idea of how affect relates to cognitive 
functioning, clearly does a poor job of representing the obtained pattern of correlations and thus the 
implication is that conventional theories may be inadequate. A large source of variance left 
unaccounted in the traditional model involved the relation between the GSE and MAAS-LO, 
suggesting that the ARCES did not effectively mediate the MAAS-LO–GSE relation in this model. 
Accordingly, the model was adjusted to provide a direct link from the MAAS-LO to the GSE. This 
change reduced the degrees of freedom of the model, and substantially improved model fit, χ
2
 (2, N = 





Figure 2.2. Alternative path model with path coefficients for self-reported boredom proneness (via 
BPS) and depression (via BDI-II) measures predicting attention (via MAAS-LO, ARCES) and self-
efficacy (via GSE) measures. Path coefficients shown are significant (p < .001) except those 



















An additional alternative to the Attention-to-Affect model comes from Bandura (1997), who noted 
both the causal relation of self-efficacy on negative emotions, including anxiety and depression, as 
well as its potential impact on future performance of everyday tasks. On this view, self-efficacy could 
be seen as the primary cause of boredom, depression, and attention lapses. Accordingly, I revised the 
model shown in Figure 2.1 to reverse the directionality of the relation between self-efficacy and 
inattention. Since the ARCES is a measure of cognitive errors resulting from attention lapses, 
however, the most theoretically compelling model is one in which there is a direct relation between 
the GSE and both the MAAS-LO and ARCES, allowing self-efficacy to produce cognitive errors at 
least in part through its influence on attention lapses. As such, this alternative model has one less 
degree of freedom than the Attention-to-Affect model. This model provided reasonably good fit for 
the data, χ
2
 (2, N = 184) = 4.21, p = .122, CFI = .994, NFI = .988, RMSEA = .078, BCC = 31.09. That 
this model fits the data relatively well is perhaps not surprising, given that it shares the majority of its 
features with the well-fitting Attention-to-Affect model. It is, however, less parsimonious than the 
Attention-to-Affect model, with one fewer free parameter. In this case it is possible to further evaluate 
the models on the basis of their BCC fit indices. The BCC fit index is intended to address 
improvements in model fit resulting from changes in parsimony, with models achieving lower BCC 
values being considered preferable. Although parsimony is not the only difference between these 
models, such comparison would regardless suggest the Attention-to-Affect model (BCC = 29.15) 
should be seen as the better of the two. 
On the whole, the theoretically-derived Attention-to-Affect model, shown in Figure 2.1, best and 
most parsimoniously fits the data. Within this model, the MAAS-LO predicts all cognitive and 
affective variables, with the GSE mediating relations between the MAAS-LO, BPS and BDI-II. 
Nonetheless, the Affect-to-Attention model and Bandura‟s model, of course, cannot be fully ruled out 
through SEM analyses alone. 
2.5 Concluding Remarks 
Expanding on the research presented in Chapter 1, which postulated attention lapses as a common 
cause in a sequence of cognitive, behavioural and affective outcomes, the present study was designed 
to investigate self-efficacy as a potential mediator between attention lapses and emotional distress. As 
a conceptual extension of the earlier Attention-to-Affect model, this study served to enhance our 
understanding of the role that everyday inattention plays in generating boredom and depression. This 
theoretically derived model, using attention lapses to predict self-efficacy as well as emotional 
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distress, provided very good fit for the data. In addition, consistent with theory and our previous 
findings, parallel models representing the received view that emotional distress leads to cognitive 
failures continued to provide poorer support for the data. Modeling self-efficacy instead as the 
primary cause of boredom, depression, and inattention similarly failed to improve on the Attention-to-
Affect model, overall providing good support for the notion that basic failures of attention are an 
important component in the onset of emotional distress. 
While correlational data cannot provide definitive knowledge about causation, a benefit of 
structural equation modeling is that it allows us to use known associations to evaluate the likelihood 
of predicted experimental outcomes in advance of such study. A continuing limitation of the present 
models is that they rely solely on self-report questionnaire assessments of attention and emotion. 
Nonetheless, a continuing strength of the particular measures of attention I employed is that they have 
been validated against a behavioural measure of attention (Cheyne et al., 2006; Smilek, Carriere, & 
Cheyne, 2010). Accordingly, the results obtained in the present study should be interpreted as a 
stimulus for additional research on the potential long-term consequences of seemingly innocuous 
lapses of attention in everyday life. 
Taken together, and consistent with my previous findings (Chapter 1), the present results suggest 
momentary lapses of attention can lead to a variety of cognitive errors. Moreover, in conjunction with 
such errors (e.g., going to the fridge to get some milk, and instead taking out the juice), such attention 
lapses may causally influence our affective well-being via their influence on our sense of self-
efficacy. Thus, the present findings once again highlight that maintaining an awareness of our actions 






The Stress of Everyday Experiences 
3.1 Introduction 
In 2008 a Canadian medivac helicopter pilot crashed while attempting a night landing in an isolated 
area; the cause of the crash was determined to be a miscalculation of the helicopter‟s altitude when 
the pilot‟s attention was divided between landing and explaining the procedure to the first officer and 
paramedics onboard (Transportation Safety Board of Canada, 2008). Such examples illustrate the 
potentially dire consequences of brief attention lapses and attention-related cognitive errors when 
they occur at an inopportune moment; but chronic attention lapses, even involving shifts to one‟s own 
thoughts, may lead to consequences that are just as debilitating. In the previous chapters, for example, 
I have presented evidence that absentmindedness can have important consequences not only for 
ongoing task performance, but also for our general emotional well-being. The present chapter further 
develops the argument that attention impacts emotional well-being by testing the hypothesis that 
everyday attention lapses can produce depression, at least in part, via their influence on one‟s stress 
level. 
The models presented in the previous chapters focused on primarily cognitive sources of affective 
dysfunction, but I am also interested in exploring intermediate affective states that might further 
illuminate the mechanisms underlying the route from attention lapses to depression. One such 
potential linking mechanism is stress, as attention lapses can make it more difficult to perform our 
normal, everyday activities and through such interference we may become stressed. Unfortunately, 
stress has traditionally been an ambiguous term, used to reference both potentially demanding 
situational contexts and the individual‟s responses to such situations. In order to reduce this confusion 
for stress research, Selye (1984) argued that „stress‟ should be reserved to describe physiological or 
emotional outcomes while the term „stressors‟ should be used to describe those events that cause 
stress. Interestingly, Selye also argued that stress is a potential consequence of almost all physical, 
cognitive, or emotional activity – essentially everything we do or feel has the potential to produce a 
stress response in the body, even if to a very minimal extent. Accordingly, to say someone is stressed 
reflects the recognition of an abundance of the stress response rather than a categorical change in our 
present state, but stress could also have a more subtle influence on our emotions and behaviour. In 
this way, if everyday inattention happens to have extraordinary consequences, such as narrowly 
 
 42 
avoiding a plane crash, it would likely produce sufficient stress to become noticeable. Similarly, if we 
experience an extraordinary abundance of minor attention-related errors in everyday life, then over 
time our stress level could also become sufficiently elevated to be perceived as bothersome; this type 
of stress production parallels that seen in “daily hassles” research (e.g., McIntyre, Korn, & Matsuo, 
2008; Monroe, 1983) and represents an indirect link between attention lapses and stress. I would take 
this view one step further, however, to suggest the experience of chronic inattention could directly 
produce stress, perhaps because inattention makes it more difficult to accomplish many everyday 
tasks (e.g., reading; Smallwood & Schooler, 2006), regardless of whether it actually leads to errors. 
3.1.1 Exploring the Link Between Attention Lapses and Stress 
The most relevant, though admittedly indirect, link between attention lapses and stress comes from 
the work of Broadbent and colleagues in their development of the Cognitive Failures Questionnaire 
(CFQ; Broadbent, Cooper, FitzGerald, & Parkes, 1982), which assesses the frequency with which 
individuals experience everyday cognitive failures, including attention-related errors. These authors 
noted that reports of frequent cognitive failures appeared to be associated with a vulnerability to 
stress, as student nurses scoring high on the CFQ were more likely to report a higher degree of 
neuroticism (via the Middlesex Hospital Questionnaire; Crown & Crisp, 1966) after being placed in a 
stressful working environment. Similar associations of cognitive failures and stress have also 
previously been addressed by Reason (1988), who additionally noted that absentmindedness and 
stress could be interchanged as either cause or effect, depending on the situation being considered. 
From this bidirectional perspective, having a general tendency toward absentmindedness could make 
one more vulnerable to negative cognitive and emotional reactions when encountering a stressor, 
consistent with Broadbent‟s findings, but being faced with a stressor could also increase 
absentmindedness, and thus create cognitive problems that were not previously present. 
Both Broadbent and Reason focused on stressors as situational conditions that might negatively 
affect the state of the individual and, as such, stress was seen as a reaction to these situations; one 
which, according to Broadbent, could be exacerbated by a general tendency toward cognitive failures. 
On this view, environmental stressors are first required to induce stress in the individual, while 
cognitive factors may serve to moderate the extent to which stress is induced. Stress has not always 
been viewed as a response to specific situational conditions, however. Indeed, stress has also been 
seen as a cognitive-emotional trait (Lazarus, 1993) which can persist across situational conditions or 
even despite the absence of such conditions. On this view, there may sometimes be no identifiable 
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situational cause for an individual‟s stress. A trait perspective offers a counterbalance to the 
situational view. That is, stress becomes an abundance of tension, arousal, and other nonspecific 
emotional distress across situations, consistent with an individual differences perspective and 
specifically with the hypothesis that individual differences in a set of physical and emotional traits 
affect various situations in everyday life. Within this framework, we depart somewhat from 
Broadbent‟s view of the role of everyday cognitive failures in stress. Rather than relying on some 
specific situational stressor, it is attention lapses, and the cognitive errors that we chronically make as 
a result of these attention lapses, which would function as a stressor. Furthermore, expanding on 
Selye‟s (1984) suggestion above, stress would refer more generally to the host of unpleasant affective 
states, such as general irritability, that attention lapses help to create, and which then have the 
potential to produce additional emotional distress in the form of depressive affect. 
3.1.2 Stress and Depression 
Stress has long been identified as an important contributor to disease in general, and is thought to be 
especially important in the initial onset and relapse of depression (Depue, 1979). Most notably, the 
contributions of stressors to depression are fundamental to the diathesis-stress model of depression. 
Such models are based on the theory that dysfunctional beliefs or behaviours tend to produce 
depression only when accompanied by stressful life events (for an interesting evaluation of diathesis-
stress models of depression, see Robins & Block, 1989). The development of depression after 
stressful events may be further influenced by the tendency to experience chronic stress (Hammen, 
Kim, Eberhart, & Brennan, 2009), and even mild levels of daily stress appear to have the potential to 
produce mood disturbance over short timescales (DeLongis, Folkman, & Lazarus, 1988). 
Additionally, decisions made while one is depressed may also create an environment in which the 
probability of experiencing future stressful events is increased (Hammen & Shih, 2008), thus creating 
a potentially vicious emotional downward spiral. 
3.1.3 Stress and Boredom Proneness 
Unlike the strong relation between stress and depression, the present body of research provides two 
observations that suggest stress may not play a substantial role in the generation of boredom 
proneness via attention lapses. First, following a review of the existing literature on boredom and 
stress in vigilance tasks, Thackray (1981) argued that in boring situations stress is actually elicited by 
the requirement, and failure, to maintain alertness rather than boredom. Thus, boredom and stress are 
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seen to be associated primarily through their common link to the failure to remain alert (i.e., to the 
inability to sustain attention to task-relevant aspects of the current situation). Second, evidence to 
support a boredom–stress association is found quite inconsistently, with studies failing to show both 
substantial prediction of stress via boredom (e.g., Rooijen, 1991) and of boredom via stress (e.g., 
Shaw, Caldwell, & Kleiber, 1996). In addition, other studies simply assume boredom produces stress 
(Wiesner, Windle, & Freeman, 2005), or explicitly combine them into the singular construct of 
boredom-stress (Parasuraman & Purohit, 2000), while using them to predict some other emotional or 
behavioural outcome. Such ad hoc mergers of boredom and stress are difficult to incorporate with the 
present theoretical considerations, in which boredom proneness and stress are distinct, but potentially 
related, emotional traits. 
Given the notable similarity in the way that boredom and stress are both typically viewed from a 
situational perspective, it is worthwhile to clarify once again that my interest in boredom remains not 
as a response to situations that seem to almost inherently demand disengagement. Instead, I am 
interested in boredom as a trait – as one‟s general propensity toward disengagement regardless of 
such situational demands. As my theoretical predictions are also based on stress as a general 
emotional trait, and consistent with Thackray‟s (1981) review, it should thus be their common 
relation to attention lapses that is primarily responsible for any observed relation between boredom 
proneness and stress. 
3.2 Stress Study 1 
Guided by the above theoretical and empirical considerations, and to further investigate routes 
through which attention lapses and associated errors influence depressive affect in particular, Stress 
Study 1 examined whether stress partially mediates these relations. In this study inattention was 
measured via the Mindful Attention Awareness Scale–Lapses Only (MAAS-LO; Chapter 1) and 
errors resulting from inattention were measured by the Attention-Related Cognitive Errors Scale 
(ARCES; Chapter 1; Cheyne et al., 2006). Boredom was measured via the Boredom Proneness Scale 
(BPS; Farmer & Sundberg, 1986), while stress and depression were both measured via their 
respective subscales on the Depression Anxiety Stress Scales (DASS; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995). 
Stress and boredom appear to be only minimally related, but stress – as a general abundance of 
tension, arousal or other nonspecific emotional distress – should nonetheless play an important role as 
a partial mediator of the relation between attention lapses and depression. Thus, based on my previous 
findings, I predicted the MAAS-LO would explain a significant amount of the variance in the BPS 
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and DASS-Depression. Furthermore, as a measure of behavioural consequences of inattention, the 
ARCES should act as a partial mediator between the MAAS-LO and DASS-Stress. As a result, the 
ARCES would not explain a significant amount of variance in DASS-Depression once relations with 
the MAAS-LO and DASS-Stress were accounted for. 
3.2.1 Method 
3.2.1.1 Participants 
Participants were 134 undergraduate students from the University of Waterloo, selected as part of a 
larger study assessing the associations between anxiety and attention and who had completed a series 
of screening questionnaires for course credit. The screening measures included the Beck Depression 
Inventory-II (Beck, Steer, & Brow, 1996), the trait version of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory 
(STAI; Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983), and the Boredom Proneness Scale 
(Farmer & Sundberg, 1986). In order to limit the potential confound of depressive affect in this 
sample for the purposes of the larger study, students scoring moderate to high on the BDI-II (≥19) or 
who did not respond 0 to question 19 regarding suicidality were excluded from participation. This 
restriction was also of some benefit to the present study, as it allowed the study to evaluate whether 
attention lapses are predictive of emotional distress even in the case of entirely sub-clinical levels of 
depressive affect. The remaining students were then oversampled for high (≤ 36) and low (≥ 47) 
scores on the STAI trait anxiety measure, again for the purposes of the larger study. Participants 
received partial course credit in exchange for their participation. The mean participant age was 19.1 
(SD = 3.32; N = 133; one participant opted not to provide her age), including 65 males (age M = 19.0; 
SD = 4.23) and 69 females (age M = 19.1; SD = 2.16). 
3.2.1.2 Measures 
Six questionnaires were completed in random order across participants, including three questionnaires 
not included as part of the present study. The additional questionnaires included the Attentional 
Control Scale (Derryberry & Reed, 2002), the Social Desirability Scale (Strahan & Gerbasi, 1972), 
and the STAI. Item mean scores were calculated for each questionnaire in order to accommodate 
three participants who each omitted a single response from the BPS; there were no other response 
omissions. Following the questionnaires, participants completed a set of eye-tracking tasks that were 
part of the larger study, in which they viewed a series of threat-related and harm-related images and 
attempted to solve difficult anagrams. 
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The 12-item Mindful Attention Awareness Scale–Lapses Only (MAAS-LO; Chapter 1) was 
selected as a measure of attention lapses. MAAS-LO items ask about mindless behaviour in everyday 
situations, such as “I find it difficult to stay focused on what‟s happening in the present.” The MAAS-
LO incorporates a Likert scale ranging from almost never (1) to almost always (6), with responses 
indicating greater frequency suggesting a greater propensity toward everyday attention lapses. Aside 
from removal of three items and the scale being direct-scored as opposed to reverse-scored the 
MAAS-LO is identical to the MAAS originally developed by Brown & Ryan (2003). 
A revised version of the Attention-Related Cognitive Errors Scale (ARCES; Cheyne et al., 2006) 
was incorporated as an assessment of notable outcomes associated with everyday attention lapses. 
The revised ARCES (Chapter 1) is a 12-item questionnaire measuring the frequency with which one 
experiences a variety of everyday cognitive failures or action slips for which an attention lapse is the 
most likely cause, and employs a Likert scale of five possible responses, ranging from never (1) to 
very often (5). The ARCES is conceptually similar to the CFQ, which Broadbent and colleagues 
(1982) previously used to relate everyday cognitive failures and stress responses, but is specific to 
errors caused by attention lapses (Cheyne et al., 2006; Smilek et al., 2010). 
Boredom was measured via the Boredom Proneness Scale (BPS; Farmer & Sundberg, 1986). The 
28-item BPS reflects one‟s responses to situations in which we are likely to become bored (e.g., 
“Having to look at someone‟s home movies or travel slides bores me tremendously”) and related trait 
characteristics of boredom (e.g., “Time always seems to be passing slowly”). The BPS uses a Likert 
scale ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7), with a neutral (4) midpoint. This scale 
was only included in the prescreening questionnaires. 
Stress and depression were measured via the relevant subscales of the short form of the Depression 
Anxiety Stress Scales (DASS; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995), as the DASS was designed with the 
specific intent of providing good discrimination between depression, anxiety, and stress, and it has 
been shown to provide good long-term stability for each subscale (Lovibond, 1998). The 21-item 
DASS includes 7 questions for each subscale, asking about one‟s experiences over the past week, and 
is scored using a Likert scale ranging from did not apply to me at all (0) to applied to me very much, 
or most of the time (3). Response values are typically doubled in the short form of the DASS, in order 
to retain total score compatibility with the long form which has 42 items, however no doubling was 
necessary for the mean item scores in the present study. To measure negative affect (depression) the 
DASS includes statements such as “I felt downhearted and blue” and “I couldn‟t seem to experience 
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any positive feelings at all,” while to measure tension (stress) it includes statements such as “I found 
myself getting agitated” and “I tended to over-react to situations.” While the DASS does not attempt 
to address the DSM-IV (American Psychiatric Association, 1994) criteria for depression, its 
depression subscale has nonetheless been shown to correlate strongly with the previous gold standard 
measures, the BDI (Antony, Bieling, Cox, Enn, & Swinson, 1998; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995) and 
BDI-II (Gloster et al., 2008), the latter having been used in my previous models (Chapters 1 & 2). 
Furthermore, for the purposes of the present study, I find the clearer focus of the DASS on the more 
common experience negative affect particularly appealing as I am concerned with the ability of 
attention lapses to predict emotional distress in general, regardless of severity. 
3.2.2 Results and Discussion 
All measures were found to have good distributional and psychometric properties. All measures also 
showed a fairly good range of scores, with little deviation from normality in skewness and kurtosis, 
and demonstrated very satisfactory internal consistency (Table 3.1). The depression subscale of the 
DASS included the most substantial deviation from normality, but was still acceptable and to be 
expected to some extent given that participants were selected on the basis of having low depression 
scores. 
Pearson Product-Moment correlation coefficients are presented in Table 3.2. All coefficients are 
moderate to large, excluding the DASS-Stress relation to the BPS which was small. As predicted, all 
measures were positively correlated. Furthermore, the correlations between attentional and mood 
measures are consistent with those of the previous chapters. 
To assess whether the association of boredom proneness with attention lapses and attention-related 
cognitive errors was mediated by stress, a step-wise multiple regression analysis (Table 3.3) was 
conducted. In this analysis, with the BPS as the dependent variable, when the MAAS-LO was added 
the beta weight for the ARCES was substantially reduced and no longer significant. The addition of 
the DASS-Stress scale had virtually no effect on the model; both the ARCES and MAAS-LO betas 
retained their previous values. Thus, the present analysis indicates the zero-order association of the 
DASS-Stress and BPS is almost entirely accounted for by common variance in the MAAS-LO, 
suggesting that stress and boredom proneness may be related only to the extent that they are both 
closely related to lapses of attention. This finding corroborates earlier work by Thackray (1981) 
examining the relation of boredom and stress in vigilance task performance. Accordingly, when 
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modeling the overall ability of attention lapses to predict affective dysfunction, stress should not serve 
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Table 3.2. Pearson Product-Moment Correlations of All Measures (N = 134) 
 
 
ARCES Stress BPS Depression 
     
Mindful Awareness of Attention – Lapses Only .67** .41**   .39** .44** 
Attention-Related Cognitive Errors  .52**   .36** .40** 
DASS–Stress   .23* .58** 
Boredom Proneness    .40** 
DASS–Depression     
 




Table 3.3. Step-Wise Multiple Regression Testing for Mediation of Attention-Related Cognitive 
Errors (ARCES) with Boredom Proneness (BPS) by Mindful Awareness of Attention (MAAS-LO) and 
Stress (DASS-Stress) 
 
Dependent Variable: BPS 
 
β t p 
Step 1    
   ARCES .36 4.42 .001 
Step 2    
   ARCES .17 1.61 .110 
   MAAS-LO .28 2.58 .001 
Step 3    
   ARCES .16 1.37 .174 
   MAAS-LO .27 2.53 .013 
   DASS–Stress .03 0.34 .733 
  





Consistent with my primary interest in extending our knowledge about the role of everyday 
attention lapses in the onset of depressive affect, the present Attention-to-Affect model was designed 
to address the hypothesis that the DASS-Stress serves as an intermediary in the relations between 
attention lapses and depression. The Attention-to-Affect model assessed the simultaneous effects of 
the MAAS-LO and DASS-Stress on the BPS and DASS-Depression, using the MAAS-LO as an 
exogenous variable predicting the ARCES, DASS-Stress, BPS and DASS-Depression. Consistent 
with theory and the present regression model, DASS-Stress was entered as a partial mediator of the 
effect of the MAAS-LO on DASS-Depression, and the ARCES was entered as a partial mediator of 
the effect of the MAAS-LO on DASS-Stress, but no path was provided from DASS-Stress to the 
BPS. This model, presented in Figure 3.1, provided very good fit indices for the data, χ
2
 (3, N = 134) 
= 3.42, p = .332, CFI = .998, NFI = .985, RMSEA = .032, consistent with the hypothesis that basic 
attentional failures can play a causal role in depression via stress. That the MAAS-LO was a weaker 
predictor of DASS-Stress than was the ARCES is unexpected given the theory discussed in the 
Introduction, and, as a result, the path from the MAAS-LO to DASS-Stress was not significant in this 
model (p = .30). Caution should be exercised when interpreting this aspect of the model, however, 
given the relatively small sample size for such a model, and restriction of the sample to individuals 
with low scores on the BDI-II. Thus, on the whole, the present analysis does generally support the 
conclusion that an initial propensity toward attention lapses and the consequences they entail are 
likely to lead to greater stress (as tension or nonspecific emotional distress), which then contributes to 





Figure 3.1. Predicted Attention-to-Affect path model with path coefficients for self-reported attention 
(via MAAS-LO, ARCES) and stress (via DASS-Stress) measures predicting boredom proneness (via 
BPS) and depression (via DASS-Depression) measures. Aside from the path from the MAAS-LO to 
DASS-Stress (p = .30), all path coefficients are significant (p < .001; except MAAS-LO to DASS-























The present analysis once again supports the theory that failures of basic cognitive mechanisms 
play an important causal role in the onset of boredom and depression through stress, and is consistent 
with the findings of the previous chapters, in which memory failures (Chapter 1) and self-efficacy 
(Chapter 2), respectively, were found to partially mediate the link between attention lapses and 
depression. With respect to the latter finding, it is interesting that self-efficacy and stress are also 
related, to the extent that self-efficacy can be seen as essential to our ability to cope with daily 
stressors. So, I was interested in conducting an additional, and larger, study in order to better integrate 
the present stress findings with the previous self-efficacy findings. 
3.3 Stress Study 2 
Attempts to minimize or avoid the effects of stress on our lives have been collectively described as 
coping, and generally fall into two categories: emotion focused coping, whereby the individual 
attempts to reappraise the situation in a more benign way, and problem focused coping, where the 
individual attempts to change the situation (Coyne, Aldwin, & Lazarus, 1981; Coyne & Lazarus, 
1980). Both coping strategies are based on an initial appraisal of the situation and one‟s abilities, 
followed by subsequent reappraisals after initial outcomes have been assessed. As such, a stress–
coping feedback loop is created, in which the apparent causal flow is dependent on how early you 
break in to the process (Coyne, Aldwin, & Lazarus, 1981). Since general self-efficacy is essentially a 
belief in our ability to handle unforeseen situations, it should play an important role at the earliest 
stages of this cycle. Indeed, a number of recent studies have shown the importance of self-efficacy in 
reducing stress and maintaining general mental health (e.g., Jerusalem & Hessling, 2009; Nauta, Liu, 
& Li, 2010; Rees & Freeman, 2009) or preventing job stress and burnout (Schwarzer & Hallum, 
2008) when individuals encounter stressful situations. Thus, consistent with previous findings 
(Chapter 2), I again hypothesized that attention-related errors would predict self-efficacy, which, 
based on existing coping theory, would then also predict stress, as well as boredom proneness and 
depression. In other respects, however, I expected this broader model to be similar to the model 
presented in Stress Study 1. 
3.3.1 Method 
3.3.1.1 Participants 
Participants were 399 undergraduate students (137 males) from the University of Waterloo, who 
completed a series of online questionnaires examining cognitive functioning and general emotional 
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experience, including the measures of interest for this study. The data were completed over three 
consecutive terms, in order to reach a sufficient sample size. Of those participants who provided their 
age, the mean was 20.8 (SD = 4.85; n = 392). The selected participants completed all five 
questionnaires and had no more than two missing responses from any questionnaire; 355 participants 
had zero missing responses. As compensation for their time participants received partial course credit. 
3.3.1.2 Materials 
In addition to the same measures included and described in Stress Study 1, the 10-item General Self-
Efficacy scale (GSE; Schwarzer & Jerusalem, 1995) was added as a measure of one‟s perceived self-
efficacy. The GSE includes items such as “I am confident that I could deal efficiently with 
unexpected events,” and uses a four-point Likert scale ranging from not at all true (1) to exactly true 
(4). Accordingly, the GSE is a measure of self-efficacy regardless of situation, as a more trait-level 
belief in one‟s ability to cope with most situations. The questionnaires were completed in random 
order, except for the BPS which was collected first as part of the initial mass testing completed every 
term with psychology students at the University of Waterloo. 
3.3.2 Results and Discussion 
Once again, the ARCES and MAAS-LO were found to have good distributional and psychometric 
properties. All measures showed a good range of scores with very satisfactory internal consistency, 
with only the GSE reflecting a small degree of kurtosis (Table 3.4). Pearson Product-Moment 
correlation coefficients are presented in Table 3.5. All coefficients are significant, and the majority 
are moderate to large. As predicted by the theory discussed in the Introduction, both the MAAS-LO 
and ARCES show strong relations with DASS-Stress. Furthermore, consistent with the findings of 
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Table 3.5. Pearson Product-Moment Correlations of All Measures 
 
 
ARCES GSE Stress BPS Depression 
      
Mindful Awareness of Attention – Lapses Only .53 -.18  .49  .37  .49 
Attention-Related Cognitive Errors  -.21  .42  .41  .33 
Generalized Self-Efficacy   -.30 -.43 -.35 
DASS–Stress     .32  .66 
Boredom Proneness      .41 
DASS–Depression      
 




The hypothesis that attention lapses, and their associated cognitive errors, would impact boredom 
proneness and depression in part through their influence on our general sense of self-efficacy and 
stress level was again addressed using structural equation modeling. As in Stress Study 1 this model 
was designed such that stress and boredom proneness were independent consequences of attention 
lapses. In the past, findings have consistently shown that attention-related errors (ARCES) and 
boredom proneness (BPS) are separate consequences of everyday attention lapses, and thus did not 
need a direct connection between the ARCES and BPS in order to produce a well-fitting model 
(Cheyne et al., 2006; Chapters 1 & 2). For the present sample, however, the hypothesized Attention-
to-Affect model did not fit the data well, owing to a substantial residual covariance between the 
ARCES and BPS. Although it is inconsistent with previous findings, and quite possibly a chance 
anomaly in the present data, the requirement of a path connecting the ARCES and BPS is not 
fundamentally inconsistent with the Attention-to-Affect model on the whole. Thus, I added this path 
for the model shown in Figure 3.2. This Attention-to-Affect model provided good fit indices for the 
data, χ
2
 (3, N = 399) = 7.41, p = .06, CFI = .994, NFI = .990, RMSEA = .061, consistent with the 
hypothesis that attention lapses produce boredom and depression via changes in self-efficacy and 
stress. The largest remaining residual covariance was between the MAAS-LO and GSE and, unlike 






Figure 3.2. Predicted Attention-to-Affect path model with path coefficients for self-reported attention 
(via MAAS-LO, ARCES), self-efficacy (GSE) and stress (via DASS-Stress) measures predicting 
boredom proneness (via BPS) and depression (via DASS-Depression) measures. All path coefficients 






























The present model once again provided good support for our proposed Attention-to-Affect model 
of how everyday attention lapses and mood are related, while simultaneously increasing the 
complexity of the model. Although my typical technique has thus far been to compare the proposed 
Attention-to-Affect model with an alternative Affect-to-Attention model, with the present set of 
variables it is unclear how exactly these alternative models should be specified. Some alternative 
models may rival the fit of our Attention-to-Affect model, but subtly misrepresent the currently 
received theories about how attention and affect are related with respect to self-efficacy and stress. 
Other alternative models may represent theory well, but provide poorer model fit and thus call the 
theory into question. It is not my claim to have addressed all potential alternatives, nor my intention 
to overfit the data in order to produce the best possible alternative model as a comparison. I therefore 
leave it up to the reader to carefully consider which alternative Affect-to-Attention models are as 
theoretically defensible as the Attention-to-Affect model, and to put these theories to the test. 
3.4 Concluding Remarks 
Starting from my earlier models (Chapters 1 & 2), which postulated attention lapses as a common 
cause of a sequence of cognitive, behavioural and affective outcomes, the present studies were 
designed to investigate an additional potential mediator between attention lapses and affective 
dysfunction. The addition of stress, as an individual tendency to experience an unpleasant abundance 
of tension, arousal and general emotional distress, allowed the expansion of my causal model from 
initial attention failures to affective outcomes. Once again, the present findings provided good support 
for the view of attention lapses as a cause of boredom and depression. I also focused primarily on 
stress as a mediator of the relation between attention and depression, to test Thackray‟s (1981) 
assertion that the association of boredom and stress was potentially just a by-product of the common 
influence of attention lapses. Consistent with this view, the present findings provide good support for 
the notion that stress and boredom are indeed separate and independent consequences of everyday 
attention lapses. 
The present findings are also consistent with a view of attention lapses as potential stressors in their 
own right – capable of producing stress without the major life events typically identified as causes of 
stress. As such Broadbent‟s view of cognitive failures moderating the link between potential stressor 
events and the stress response may be reconceptualised as, rather, reflecting the tendency for 
individuals who are already experiencing stress due to chronic inattention to encounter even greater 
stress when placed in demanding situations. There remains the distinct possibility, however, that 
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everyday inattention also increases the likelihood that we encounter difficult life situations, or that we 
handle them more poorly, and so stressful life events are still an important and necessary component 
of the attention–stress relation. As I did not specifically inquire about these participants‟ experience 
of stressful life events the present findings cannot address this question. 
It is important to always acknowledge that correlational data cannot provide definitive knowledge 
about causation. Nonetheless, an important benefit of structural equation modeling is that it allows us 
to use known interrelations to evaluate the likelihood of predicted experimental outcomes in advance 
of such study. That several different studies, each of which evaluated separate mediators of the link 
between attention lapses and affective distress, have produced similar findings makes their 
predictions all the more compelling. Accordingly, just as with the previous findings (Chapters 1 & 2), 
the results obtained in the present studies should be interpreted as highly suggestive of a need for 
additional research on the potential long-term consequences of seemingly innocuous lapses of 
attention in everyday life. 
As with the previous chapters, a limitation of the present models is that they rely solely on self-
report questionnaire assessments of attention and mood, although a strength of these measures of 
attention is that they have been validated against relevant indices of the Sustained Attention to 
Response Task (Cheyne et al., 2006; Smilek et al., 2010). In any case, this limitation is to a certain 
extent a necessity in that, thus far, my research has been on trait-level tendencies of the individual. 
That is, I investigated general tendencies to be inattentive, stressed, bored, or depressed in everyday 
life regardless of specific situations one might encounter. Taking these general tendencies to the level 
of specific situations may not be easily accomplished because any given situation will inevitably 
introduce its own additional complexities; such complexities are often unexpected, and thus 
interpretation of the results is made more difficult. For example, it is probable that, although attention 
lapses may have a primary role in the aetiology of depression, depressed affect will be associated with 
self-focused depressive rumination that provides additional attentional load and is associated with 
mind-wandering away from important characteristics of the task at hand (Smallwood et al., 2003; 
Smallwood, O‟Connor, Sudbery, & Obonsawin, 2007) – and this process is likely to play out over 
both long and short timescales. Furthermore, laboratory tasks that attempt to manipulate mood may 
also involve unintentional manipulations of sustained attention, or vice versa, which can make it 
difficult to evaluate the causal relation between attention and affect even in an experimental setting. 
Nonetheless, with careful control and interpretation, future studies might benefit from including more 
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state level measures of attention lapses and an attempt to discover the cognitive and behavioural 
foundations of the disengagement from everyday experience that I have argued plays an important 
role in the onset of boredom and depression. 
On the whole, the present results provide good support for the hypothesis that attention lapses can 
set in motion processes that ultimately lead to boredom and depression, including those working via 
their influence on our stress level. This process is likely to be, in part, also mediated by the effects of  
failures of attention on our general sense of our ability to accomplish both everyday and novel tasks. 
These models redefine the role of attention lapses in our everyday emotional experiences, and are all 
the more compelling as a result of the consistency with which attempts to address the causal relations 
underlying these experiences produce similarly well-fitting models. Nonetheless, the precise ways in 
which attention plays a profound role in our general emotional well-being will not be fully understood 








Reactivity to Attentional Challenges 
4.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapters I have presented data that test the hypothesis that mundane episodes of 
inattention, and their resulting cognitive and behavioural errors, are a potential cause of general 
emotional distress, including boredom and depression. One of the mechanisms I have argued is likely 
to play a key role in this process is the subjective disconnection, and disengagement, from ongoing 
experience that is a probable outcome of chronic attention lapses. This is consistent with existing 
emotional theory, inasmuch as both boredom and depression are often seen to incorporate a loss of 
motivation, productivity, or interest in everyday routines, which ought to be reflective of this 
disengagement. An important assumption of the disengagement hypothesis, and the models I have 
presented, is that attention lapses themselves have negative effects on our emotions, and that the 
cumulative effect of these emotional reactions over time is a noticeable change in our general 
emotional well-being. Such emotional responses to inattention need not be subjectively striking; 
indeed, the initial responses may well be small, and perhaps even generally go unnoticed, but when 
they occur frequently enough their effects have the potential to be greatly amplified. What is now 
needed to support this theory of long-term emotional change as a result of inattention is direct 
evidence that people do react to attention lapses and their consequences. The present study therefore 
seeks to explore these origins of the proposed disengagement mechanism through the measurement of 
direct and immediate physiological responses to errors on a sustained attention task. 
 Perhaps the most common and readily recognized form of everyday inattention is mind wandering. 
Mind wandering is essentially an attentional disengagement from the external environment, in favor 
of internal processing (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006), and it has been singled out as a major 
contributor to errors on sustained attention tasks (e.g., Cheyne, Carriere, & Smilek, 2006; Robertson, 
Manly, Andrade, Baddeley, & Yiend, 1997; Smallwood et al., 2004). Consistent with this view, 
periods of mind wandering have been shown to involve a decreased neural analysis of external events 
(Christoff et al., 2009; Smallwood et al., 2008; Weissman, Roberts, Visscher, & Woldorff, 2006). As 
well, research has shown eye fixations made when attempting to read while mind wandering are 
longer than those made when on-task, and are less affected by lexical and linguistic properties of the 
text (Reichle, Reineberg, & Schooler, in press). More critical to the present study is recent research 
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showing that periods of mind wandering during reading are also characterized by a greater blinking 
frequency than periods of on-task attention to the text (Smilek, Carriere, & Cheyne, 2010). To explain 
this finding Smilek and colleagues offered the hypothesis that an increased blink frequency is an 
effective mechanism by which to physically filter out external information in order to facilitate the 
internal focus needed to sustain the activation required for off-task processing. Put another way, when 
attention is directed internally the external world is also shut out. Thus, there is the potential that 
everyday attention lapses could produce similar consequences, and a change in blinking behaviour 
following attentional failures, then, could be seen as an indicator or even a potential cause of 
disengagement from the external world. 
One possible roadblock to studying attention-related blink rates in a laboratory setting is the strong 
strategic connection between blink behaviour and task demands. For example, research has shown 
that blinking is highly regulated during visual tasks, tending to occur either before stimulus 
presentation or after stimulus detection (e.g., Fogarty & Stern, 1989; Orchard & Stern, 1991; Fukuda, 
1994). Thus, since the full duration of continuous attention tasks is typically longer than blinking can 
be inhibited, it is likely that some strategic task synchronization will occur, so as to minimize the loss 
of critical information. In studies showing strategic blinking effects, participants are typically given 
explicit instructions about the timing of onsets and offsets of visual stimuli. In vigilance or sustained 
attention tasks, however, this information is more likely to be implicitly extracted from salient task 
characteristics. Along these lines, research has shown that individuals who are lipreading implicitly 
withhold blinking until visually noticeable pauses in the speech (Lesner & Hardick, 1982). Similarly, 
a recent study reported that participants watching a movie blinked in synchrony both with themselves 
when watching the same movie on a different occasion, and with other individuals watching the same 
movie (Nakano et al., 2009). In this case, the source of the synchrony appeared to be scene breaks or, 
even more importantly, personally meaningful break points such as the end of an action sequence or 
the departure of the main character. If one views action sequences or main characters as equivalently 
important to the individual as the presentation of stimuli in a visual search task, then these more real-
world findings are remarkably consistent with the more typical laboratory task findings above. 
Furthermore, they suggest that, for a sustained attention task involving frequent presentation of 
stimuli, blinking will be limited to periods when stimuli are not present, or are unchanging. 
Accordingly, we might expect any attention-related differences in blinking behaviour to appear only 
after the participant has had the opportunity to fully examine the currently presented stimulus. 
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The Sustained Attention to Response Task (SART; Robertson et al., 1997) is an ideal candidate for 
creating inattention in a laboratory setting and examining blinking behaviour in relation to attention 
lapses. The SART was developed with the intention of providing a brief, reliable, and valid measure 
of failures of sustained attention (Robertson et al., 1997), defined as a self-sustained, conscious, mode 
of thought and observation during monotonous tasks that encourage automatic, or mindless, 
responding. This monotony is established through the rapid presentation of digit stimuli 
approximately once every second, and the infrequent presentation of target stimuli. An important 
feature of the SART is that, unlike previous vigilance tasks, it involves only one simple response 
decision, to press or not to press, and pressing is the correct response for approximately 89% of trials. 
The SART thus allows for the development of a habitual response pattern that must be occasionally 
overridden by an attentive, conscious, decision not to press. Accordingly, the continuation of the 
habitual response on a trial when it was not indicated (a NOGO trial) is taken as a task-related 
consequence of a failure of sustained attention. Thus, the critical attention failure measure yielded by 
the SART is a count of failures to withhold a response when presented with the NOGO signal (SART 
error). Robertson and colleagues (1997) have shown SART error rates to have good test-retest 
stability over a period of two weeks (r = .76), suggesting individual SART performance is relatively 
stable over time. 
Prior research has already provided indirect evidence of reactivity to the consequences of attention 
lapses in the SART. For NOGO trials immediately following another NOGO trial, or with only one 
intervening GO trial, individuals tend to show (1) a substantially increased probability of committing 
an error and (2) a speeding of reaction times (Cheyne, Carriere, & Smilek, 2010; Cheyne, Solman, 
Carriere, & Smilek, 2009). These findings are potentially suggestive of at least some reactivity to 
attentional challenges, but their interpretation is somewhat compromised by the fact they are 
temporally disconnected from the challenge itself by at least one second. Furthermore, these potential 
reactions to attentional challenge are observable only insofar as they influence the participant‟s 
subsequent key press reaction time. Focusing on blink behaviour instead of key presses effectively 
overcomes these interpretive hurdles, by allowing observation of reactivity through the full duration 
of the critical NOGO trial and being physically disconnected from the primary task response. It is, 
however, worthwhile to take this potential reactivity into account, and to specifically examine blink 
behaviour outside of these unusual NOGO trials in order to determine whether typical reactions to 
discrete attentional challenges, rather than connected series‟ of challenges, may produce a 
disconnection from one‟s ongoing experience. 
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The present study is intended to be largely exploratory with respect to the relation between blinking 
and attention in the SART, but, based on the foregoing review, I predicted that participants would 
largely inhibit blinking on each trial until after stimulus presentation. While there are no specific cues 
for the precise timing of stimulus onset in the SART, the uniformity of trial length in itself provides a 
very reliable temporal cue. This will have the effect of synchronizing blinking across participants, just 
as the movie clips did in the study by Nakano and colleagues (2009). Additionally, when a NOGO 
trial is encountered on the SART it represents an attentional challenge for the participant, requiring a 
change in behaviour and potentially encouraging self-evaluation of ongoing task performance. Such 
internally directed thought is reminiscent of task-related mind wandering, to the extent that it 
represents a distraction from processing of the ongoing task at hand. Therefore, given the hypothesis 
that blinking behaviour reflects an individual‟s engagement with external events, and is increased 
during mind wandering, I expected to find changes in blinking behaviour surrounding the critical 
NOGO trials on the SART, relative to trials on which a participant‟s attentional state was not 
challenged. This blink reaction could serve to moderate the ability of external information to interfere 
with more internally focused thought. A change in the synchrony of blink behaviour surrounding 
NOGO trials could manifest as an increase in the overall probability of eyelid closure on NOGO 
trials, as participants momentarily evaluate their performance. As well, the hypothesis that attention 
lapses result in task disengagement offers the further prediction that NOGO error trials will have 
higher probabilities of blinking than both correct NOGO trials and temporally paired GO trials, as 
errors are more salient events for evaluating attentional performance and should produce more 
internal processing. As the present study is admittedly mainly exploratory, two groups of participants 
were collected. This allowed the formation of more specific hypotheses on the basis of findings from 
the first group, and replication of those findings in the second group. 
4.2 Method 
4.2.1 Participants 
Participants were two groups of 44 and 47 undergraduate psychology students from the University of 
Waterloo research experiences group. The second group was collected so as to provide replication of, 
and support for, findings observed with the first group. Six participants from the first group and six 
participants from the second group were excluded on the basis of extended sections of missing eye 
tracking data, most likely due to substantial head movements made after system calibration. An 
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additional two participants were subsequently excluded from the first group on the basis of providing 
fewer than ten (approximately 15%) correct (1) or error (1) NOGO responses, and six participants 
were excluded from the second group due to computer error (1), failure to calibrate (1), blindness in 
one eye (1), blinking less than once per minute (1), or providing fewer than ten error responses (2). 
This reflects a large proportion of participant data loss, but the majority was expected as a result of 
the need to complete a full block of SART trials without interruptions for recalibration. For the first 
group the final selection of participants with complete data included 10 males and 26 females with a 
mean age of 20.17, SD = 2.09. For the second group the final selection of participants with complete 
data included 14 males and 21 females with a mean age of 18.74, SD = 1.22. In appreciation of their 
time participants received partial course credit. 
4.2.2 Apparatus 
4.2.2.1 SART 
The Sustained Attention to Response Task (SART; Robertson, Manly, Andrade, Baddeley, & Yiend, 
1997) is widely used as a behavioral measure of sustained attention failures. The SART requires 
participants to respond to a sequentially presented series of digits and to withhold a response when an 
infrequent critical NOGO digit appears. The version employed for the present study is the same as 
was used in Smilek et al. (2010), but it was reprogrammed in SR Research Experiment Builder for 
use with the eye tracker. The mask presented following each digit was a double ringed annulus shape 
( ), to avoid disproportionate masking of the digit 8 at larger font sizes. The outer ring was sized 
such that it did not overlap with any digits, even at the largest font size, while the inner ring was sized 
such that it had minimal overlap with digits in any of the five standard font sizes (48, 72, 94, 100, 
120). As well, the intervening number of GO trial digits (digits 1, 2, 4–9) appearing between NOGO 
trials (the digit 3) was specifically varied from 0 (i.e., sequential NOGO trials) to 16, with each 
interval being used exactly twice over the course of the task. This range represents the full 
complement of potential NOGO-to-NOGO intervals for the standard SART. In order to accommodate 
this distribution of target intervals 315 SART trials were completed, and SART error rates were 
calculated as a proportion of NOGO trials on which the default response was not withheld. Each 
block of SART trials was recorded as one trial for the eye tracker, in order to achieve constant 
monitoring of the eyes, with tags inserted to the data recording at the point of display changes so that 
individual SART trials could be extracted in post-processing. Participants responded to GO trials by 
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using the index finger of their dominant hand to pull the trigger button on a Microsoft SideWinder 
gamepad, and were instructed to respond as quickly as they could while also trying not to make any 
mistakes. 
4.2.2.2 Eye-tracking 
As individuals completed the SART, pupils and corneal reflections were monitored using an SR 
Research Ltd. EyeLink 1000 desk-mounted eye tracking system. Both eyes were calibrated prior to 
each block of SART trials, and a blink was defined as a period in which a pupil was not detected for 
either eye for at least 10 ms over a 25 ms period (sampled at 1000 Hz). The system was calibrated 
using a randomly ordered presentation of 9 calibration dots, and the system‟s default settings for 
acceleration and velocity thresholds were used for saccade detection. 
Two display screens were used. The stimulus displays for the SART were presented to participants 
on a Dell 2407WFP 24” LCD colour monitor at a resolution of 1920 x 1200. During the task the 
participants‟ eye movements were also presented to the experimenter on a second monitor, so that 
observations about real-time calibration and gaze position could be made. This allowed the 
experimenter to evaluate system performance throughout the experiment and to note which 
participants had to be excluded from analysis on the basis of calibration loss over time. As 
participants could not be interrupted during the SART without potentially affecting their sustained 
attention to the task, this method ensured both optimal eye data integrity and comparability of 
behaviour for the remaining participants. 
4.2.3 Procedure 
All participants first completed a series of questionnaires that are not included in the present analyses, 
including the MAAS-LO (Chapter 1), ARCES (Chapter 1), and DASS (Lovibond & Lovibond, 
1995). Following the questionnaires, participants were given instructions for performing the SART 
and then completed a block of 18 practice trials, including 2 NOGO trials. The experimenter observed 
participant performance during the practice trials and corrected any participants who did not appear to 
be following the instructions (e.g., withholding their responses for GO trials). After completion of the 
practice trials participants completed the SART twice, with calibration of the eye tracker being 
performed prior to each block of trials. The two blocks used different sequences of digit presentation, 
but within each block all participants received the exact same digit sequence. As each block of trials 
lasted approximately 6 minutes, the total amount of time spent performing the SART was 
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approximately 12 minutes. Following each block of the SART, including the practice block, 
participants were asked to answer a series of pilot questions in which they rated their current 
subjective experience with respect to boredom, depression, self-efficacy, stress, anxiety, task 
difficulty, and the passage of time, then they observed but did not respond to a block of 27 SART 
trials. As with the initial questionnaires, these pilot questions are not included in the present analyses. 
4.3 Results 
Mean SART error rates, reaction times (for responses of at least 200 ms; Cheyne et al., 2009), blink 
measures, and questionnaire scores for both samples are reported in Table 4.1. On average, 
participants responded in error for 40% of NOGO trials, and made correct responses to GO trials 
within 390 ms of stimulus onset. Large individual differences in blink behaviour were found, as 
indicated by the high standard deviation, but on average participants blinked approximately 30 times 




Table 4.1. Sample Means and Standard Deviations for SART and Eye Tracking Measures 
 
 
Sample One (N=36) 
 





SART Errors .41 .15  .40 .19 
GO Reaction Time 381.8 53.5  397.8 80.8 
Number of Blinks 366.8 259.6  355.9 203.4 






In order to determine whether the task demands of the SART caused participants to synchronize 
their blinking behaviour with stimulus presentation, I first looked at the overall viewing patterns of 
the two groups. The most informative trials are those on which participants‟ attention is explicitly 
tested and so the NOGO trials were selected for analysis, along with the preceding and following 
trials as a comparison sample. Since prior research has indicated atypical response behaviour is 
observed for NOGO trials immediately following another NOGO trial, or with only one intervening 
GO trial (Cheyne et al., 2010), these trials were excluded, leaving 60 NOGO trials for analysis. This 
exclusion ensured both the critical NOGO event and the trials preceding a critical event were 
representative of reactions to discrete instances of attentional challenge, rather than combined 
reactions to near-simultaneously repeated attentional challenges. Although combined reactions to 
repeated attentional challenges are also interesting in their own right, the present task design involved 
too few of these trials to get an accurate measure of participant behaviour in response to such events. 
In addition to the above exclusion, as with the trials preceding a NOGO trial, only GO trials were 
selected for analysis following a critical NOGO event, leaving 56 trials for inclusion in this measure. 
The primary comparison will be between NOGO trials and the preceding GO trial, but examination of 
the subsequent GO trial allows us to see whether reactivity to attentional challenges typically persists 
beyond the NOGO trial itself. The two samples are considered separately for the following analyses, 
and only those findings which replicate across samples receive critical discussion. 
I began by examining the overall viewing behaviour for the NOGO trials on which participants 
correctly withheld their response, and the preceding and following trials, shown in Figure 4.1. This 
figure plots the overall probability of participants having their eyes open over the course of a trial, 
with negative time indicating the tail end of the preceding trial. Confidence intervals are plotted at 
each millisecond for both GO trials preceding a NOGO trial, and for NOGO trials. In Panel A the 
viewing behaviour of participants in the first sample shows virtually 100% viewing of the stimulus 
during its entire presentation, with viewing probability declining substantially beginning 
approximately 100 ms after stimulus offset for GO trials and approximately 250 ms after stimulus 
offset for NOGO trials. Similarly, viewing probability reaches its minimum approximately 325 ms 
after stimulus offset for GO trials and approximately 400 ms after stimulus offset for NOGO trials. 
Finally, viewing probability appears to recover significantly more rapidly for GO trials than for 
NOGO trials, as indicated by the non-overlapping confidence intervals, though both reach full 
recovery within 750 ms of stimulus offset. There is no significant difference in viewing behaviour 
between GO trials preceding or following NOGO trials, indicating that reactivity is restricted to the 
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NOGO trial itself. Panel B shows the viewing behaviour of participants in the second sample and 
presents a strikingly similar pattern of findings. Indeed, there are only two noticeable departures 
between Panels A and B. First, the minimum GO trial viewing probabilities are lower in the second 
sample than the first, though not significantly so. Second, the minimum NOGO trial viewing 
probability is higher in the second sample than the first, though again this difference is not significant. 
Overall, these findings suggest that viewing behaviour following events that test attention is 
substantially different from viewing behaviour following events that do not test attention, but is in 








Figure 4.1. Overall probability of participants‟ eyes being open during NOGO trials with a correctly 
withheld response and surrounding GO trials for Sample One (Panel A) and Sample Two (Panel B). 




An equivalent analysis was performed for NOGO trials on which participants failed to correctly 
withhold their response (i.e., committed a SART error), shown in Figure 4.2. Again confidence 
intervals are plotted at each millisecond for both GO trials preceding a NOGO trial, and for NOGO 
trials. In Panel A the viewing behaviour of participants in the first sample shows virtually 100% 
viewing of the stimulus during its entire presentation, just as was found for trials with correctly 
withheld NOGO responses. Thus, SART errors are clearly not typically caused by a failure to observe 
the stimulus. Once more viewing probability declined substantially shortly after stimulus offset for 
GO trials, and after a longer delay for NOGO trials, with this also translating into a similar disparity 
between GO and NOGO trials in the time to reach the minimum viewing probability. Furthermore, as 
with correct withholds, viewing probability recovers significantly more rapidly for GO trials than for 
NOGO trials, though in this case it appears viewing probability may not fully recover until within 50 
ms of the start of the subsequent trial (see negative time points for the Post-Error line, upper left hand 
corner). Panel B once more shows the viewing behaviour of participants in the second sample, and it 
again presents a strikingly similar pattern of findings. There is only one noticeable departure between 
Panels A and B; the minimum viewing probability is reached approximately 50 ms earlier in Panel A 
than in Panel B, for NOGO trials and GO trials preceding NOGO trials. Overall, these findings again 
suggest that viewing behaviour following critical events is substantially different from viewing 
behaviour following non-critical events, and is highly synchronized with task demands. Furthermore, 
they suggest potentially significant differences in blink behaviour following attention-related error 








Figure 4.2. Overall probability of participants‟ eyes being open during NOGO trials with an error 
response and surrounding GO trials for Sample One (Panel A) and Sample Two (Panel B). 95% CI is 




Given the apparent difference in the time point at which viewing probability began to decline 
during GO and NOGO trials, the latency to post-stimulus blink onset was examined for these trials. 
Figure 4.3 shows the post-stimulus blink onset latencies for participants in the first (Panel A) and 
second (Panel B) samples. Both panels indicate a significant difference between blink latencies 
during the GO trials preceding a NOGO trial and NOGO trials with a correctly withheld response 
(Sample One: two-tailed t(35) = 4.73, p = .000; Sample Two: two-tailed t(32) = 5.33, p = .000), or on 
which an error was committed (Sample One: two-tailed t(35) = 5.76, p = .000; Sample Two: two-
tailed t(31) = 4.61, p = .000). Thus, when faced with an attentional challenge participants took 
significantly longer to initiate their routine blink behaviour; this suggests an important reaction to the 
challenge itself, since it occurred regardless of response accuracy. There were no significant 
differences in blink onset latency between error and correct NOGO trials, or between latencies for 








Figure 4.3. Mean post-stimulus blink onset latency during NOGO trials and surrounding GO trials 
















































The apparent differences in time to full viewing recovery between NOGO trials and the 
immediately preceding GO trials were examined next. Figure 4.4 shows the overall mean proportion 
of trial time spent blinking for participants in the first (Panel A) and second (Panel B) samples. There 
are two main findings. First, participants spent significantly more time with their eyes closed during 
NOGO trials on which errors were committed than during the immediately preceding trials (Sample 
One: two-tailed t(35) = 3.89, p = .000; Sample Two: two-tailed t(34) = 2.89, p = .007). Second, 
participants spent significantly more time with their eyes closed during NOGO trials on which errors 
were committed than during NOGO trials on which their response was correctly withheld (Sample 
One: two-tailed t(35) = 2.12, p = .041; Sample Two: two-tailed t(34) = 2.09, p = .044). As such, 
although participants showed delayed blinking behaviour regardless of response accuracy, they 
showed an extended blink reaction only for trials on which an error was committed. To further 
examine this extended blink reaction, it was broken down to its two constituent components: number 
of blinks and blink duration. The mean number of blinks during GO trials prior to NOGO error trials 
was 0.57 (SD = 0.46) for the first sample and 0.58 (SD = 0.40) for the second sample, while during 
NOGO error trials it was 0.81 (SD = 0.47) for the first sample and 0.73 (SD = 0.40) for the second 
sample. These differences were both statistically significant (Sample One: two-tailed t(35) = 4.30, p = 
.000; Sample Two: two-tailed t(34) = 2.07, p = .047). The mean blink duration, by comparison, was 
nearly identical for NOGO error trials and their preceding GO trials (Sample One: GO M = 152.9 ms, 
SD = 156.5; NOGO M = 147.6 ms, SD = 84.2; Sample Two: GO M = 131.8 ms, SD = 67.2; NOGO M 
= 134.3, SD = 59.6). Accordingly, the differences in blink duration between GO and NOGO error 
trials were not statistically significant (Sample One: two-tailed t(35) = 0.26, p = .798; Sample Two: 








Figure 4.4. Mean proportion of trial time spent blinking during NOGO trials and surrounding GO 






















































Taken together, the present findings support three main conclusions. First, participants viewing 
behaviour was, overall, highly synchronized with the presentation of stimuli during the SART, 
withholding blinks until after digit presentation. Second, blinks were withheld longer following 
attentional challenges than when attention was not being challenged. Finally, when participants 
committed errors, and thus their failure to sustain attention was made obvious, they took longer to 
resume regular viewing behaviour, due to an increased rate of blinking. 
4.4 Discussion 
The present study was designed to address the question of whether attention lapses, and in particular 
attention-related errors, have the potential to result in a disengagement from one‟s ongoing 
experience. Disengagement was measured as a change in blinking behaviour (i.e., momentarily 
shutting off the external world) surrounding attentional challenges in a sustained attention task. The 
results showed substantial synchrony of blinking behaviour around the offset of the critical stimuli, 
and a significantly delayed blink reaction when those stimuli represented an attentional challenge. In 
addition, I found that when participants failed to rise to an attentional challenge, and withhold their 
key presses, they spent more time blinking prior to the next trial – potentially allowing them a 
moment to better reflect on the mistake. These findings are consistent with previous research 
discussed in the Introduction, which showed synchrony of blink behaviour with visual task demands 
(e.g., Fukuda, 1994; Nakano et al., 2009) and a greater blink frequency during periods of internally 
directed thought than periods of on-task reading (Smilek et al., 2010). 
While a blink necessarily suppresses visual processing as a result of the eyelid‟s physical occlusion 
of the retina, previous research has shown that cortical visual system suppression actually begins prior 
to retinal occlusion, and extends after this occlusion has terminated (Bristow, Frith, & Rees, 2005; 
Manning, Riggs, & Komenda, 1983; Ridder & Tomlinson, 1997; Volkmann, Riggs, & Moore, 1980). 
Interestingly, Volkmann and colleagues (1980) have shown visual suppression persisting for 200 ms 
following blink onset, which reflects a typical continuation of visual suppression for 50 to 100 ms 
after at least partial return of stimulation to the retina. These suppression effects are important to 
interpreting the present results and their relation to previous SART findings. In particular, previous 
research (Cheyne et al., 2010; Cheyne, Solman, Carriere, & Smilek, 2009) has identified a 
substantially increased probability of error commission on the second of two successive NOGO trials, 
especially when an error was committed on the first of the pair. One interpretation of these findings is 
that they reflect a continued state of mind wandering across trials (although this interpretation is not 
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consistent with the similarly increased error probability following correctly withheld responses). The 
present findings suggest an alternative: as a reaction to the attentional challenge of NOGO trials 
participants showed a much later return to near 100% viewing probability when an error was 
committed, and so the visual system may not yet have been fully prepared by the onset of the 
subsequent stimulus, thereby potentially hampering stimulus recognition and affecting response 
selection. Even for NOGO trials with correctly withheld responses similar, though not quite as 
dramatic, delays were found in the return to near 100% viewing probability and so this same 
explanation applies to the increased probability of error commission on successive NOGO trials. Of 
course, a strategic explanation – that participants simply do not expect successive NOGO trials and 
take the opportunity to reduce their vigilance – applies equally well, so in the future our 
understanding of reactivity to attentional challenges would benefit from research attempting to 
adjudicate these possibilities. 
In the Introduction I discussed the motivation for the present study in terms of the hypothesis that 
mundane episodes of inattention, and their resulting cognitive and behavioural errors, are a cause of 
general emotional distress. The key mechanism presumed to be involved in this process is a 
subjective disconnection from, and disengagement with, ongoing experience as a result of chronic 
attention lapses. As an initial attempt to experimentally address the validity of this mechanism, 
blinking behaviour was examined after attentional challenges. The data provided some support for the 
disengagement hypothesis, in the form of an increased blink frequency following attention-related 
errors. This increased blink behaviour serves to shut out the external world following errors, and 
therefore assists the individual in focusing more internally for at least a few moments. Such reactions 
to inattention, however, if sufficiently frequent or occurring in sufficiently important scenarios, might 
lead to an inadequate sense of stimulation by, and engagement with, the world around us. At the same 
time, the recognition of these attentional difficulties could also influence our sense of our ability to 
cope with both everyday tasks and novel challenges that require periods of sustained attention to 
manage them effectively. These processes form the foundation of the Attention-to-Affect models 
presented in the previous chapters. 
A notable limitation of the present study is that, although some evidence was found for the 
proposed disengagement mechanism, given that participants‟ affective state was not measured 
following attentional challenges, the present data were unable to show the corresponding change in 
emotional state that the Attention-to-Affect model predicts should occur. Future research would thus 
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benefit from an attempt to either directly or indirectly measure emotional state surrounding attentional 
challenges. Furthermore, that previous research has found elevated blink rates during rather than after 
mind wandering would suggest similar effects should have been found in the present study, as a 
difference in blink rate for the trials preceding correct and error NOGO responses. It is likely that the 
lack of a difference in blink behaviour between these trials is largely due to the need to synchronize 
blink behaviour with the progression of the task itself, and so future research might attempt to 
minimize visual task demands, perhaps by incorporating an auditory, rather than visual, presentation 
of stimuli. 
Despite its limitations, the present findings overall provide an enlightening first look at the 
reactivity elicited by attentional challenges, and by the failure to meet those challenges. While 
exploratory in nature, several interesting findings were found to replicate well across the two samples 
collected. Perhaps most informative are the findings of delayed blink behaviour following attentional 
challenges, and an increased blink frequency following attentional failures. This latter finding is 
particularly supportive of the theory that attention lapses lead to greater disengagement from one‟s 
ongoing experiences and, if they occur frequently enough, may over time produce sufficient 
disengagement to evolve into the more complex negative affective traits whose development was 







Through a series of self-report questionnaire studies I examined the potential for everyday attention 
lapses to create chronic boredom and, subsequently, to lead to depression. In the first chapter I 
examined this process through the intermediate role of memory failures, while in the second I 
examined the role of self-efficacy, and in the third I added psychological stress as a further 
intermediate between attention lapses and affective dysfunction. Each study provided good support 
for the hypothesis that attention lapses can serve as an initial cause of boredom and depression while 
acting in part through memory failures, self-efficacy, and stress, respectively. Following from these 
models I found experimental support for the hypothesized disconnect from one‟s present experiences 
as a result of attention lapses, through a laboratory study employing the Sustained Attention to 
Response Task. This study revealed a significant influence of attentional challenges on blinking 
behaviour, suggesting that whenever our attentional capacity is tested we have a tendency to 
momentarily direct our thoughts inwardly, and that the overall duration of this redirection is 
significantly expanded, through an increased blink rate, following lapses of attention and the 
commission of attention-related errors. 
Research in a number of other domains is likely to see some benefit from further consideration of 
the role of everyday cognitive failures. First, the potential causal importance of everyday attention 
and memory deficits could be re-assessed in areas where research has previously viewed these 
deficits as symptomatic, such as post-traumatic stress disorder (Vasterling et al., 2002) and additional 
emotional or anxiety disorders (Mathews & MacLeod, 2005). Second, treatment techniques could be 
re-assessed to determine the extent to which current practices in the treatment of affective dysfunction 
address everyday attention and memory deficits and whether more intensified treatment of these 
deficits would help to speed recovery or reduce the likelihood of relapse. In particular, additional 
research is necessary to determine the extent of the beneficial effects of attention training with respect 
to depression (e.g., Attention Training Therapy; Wells, 1990). 
An important limitation of the model studies presented in the first three chapters is that they rely 
solely on self-report questionnaire assessments of attention and affect, although the strength of the 
particular measures of attention employed is that they have already been validated against a 
behavioural measure of attention (Cheyne et al., 2006; Smilek et al., 2010). As well, a related 
limitation of the current research is that it used samples of undergraduate university students 
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(Chapters 1 & 3) or the general population (Chapter 2) and provided only a self-report questionnaire 
assessment of depression. In particular, this could limit the applicability of the present findings to the 
experience of sub-clinical depression as a follow-up clinical assessment of individuals responding 
with high levels of depression was not performed. In this case, for future studies on the role of basic 
cognitive mechanisms in sub-clinical depression, it may make sense to continue to use measures of 
sub-clinical depression, such as the DASS (Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995), which was used for the 
studies in Chapter 3, or the CES-D (Radloff, 1977), rather than the clinically-oriented BDI-II. 
However, it is worth highlighting that Papageorgiou & Wells (2000) did perform a clinical 
assessment of depression in their research on the effectiveness of attention training, and so their 
findings appear to support the present conclusions when using a clinically depressed sample. 
Furthermore, I find no reason to presume a discontinuous relation between the cognitive and affective 
difficulties associated with clinical and sub-clinical depression. Therefore, had a clinical assessment 
of depression been performed for the present samples, I would predict attention lapses and their 
related errors should still play a causal role in the onset of depression. 
While inconsistent with most theories of the role of the cognitive deficits found in depression, the 
present findings are all compatible with a re-conception of the causal importance of attention lapses in 
depression, and potentially emotional distress in general. Similarly, in the models presented boredom 
proneness was also included as a predictor, rather than mere correlate, of depression as it seems 
reasonable that boredom proneness, which more clearly represents an inability to engage our 
environment, may be a potential contributor to the development of dysphoric states and depression. In 
the concluding experiment evidence was found to support this hypothesized disengagement following 
attention lapses, but more work is needed to fully understand the processes involved in the path from 
inattention to boredom and depression. In particular, while I have shown reactivity to attentional 
challenges in terms of blink behaviour, the present theory that chronic attention lapses lead to 
affective dysfunction would benefit strongly from future research showing emotional reactions to 
attentional challenges. Nonetheless, on the whole, the present research provides compelling first 
evidence that a conscious awareness of our actions is an important contributor not only to our 
effective completion of everyday tasks, but to our long-term emotional health. 
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Appendix A 












10 I have gone to the fridge to get one thing (e.g., milk) and taken 
something else (e.g., juice). 
0.54 
2. 12 I go into a room to do one thing (e.g., brush my teeth) and end 
up doing something else (e.g., brush my hair). 
0.56 
3. New I have lost track of a conversation because I zoned out when 
someone else was talking. 
0.58 
4. 1 I have absent-mindedly placed things in unintended locations 
(e.g., putting milk in the pantry or sugar in the fridge). 
0.54 
5. 5 I have gone into a room to get something, got distracted, and 
wondered what I went there for. 
0.65 
6. 7 I begin one task and get distracted into doing something else. 0.60 
7. 2 When reading I find that I have read several paragraphs without 
being able to recall what I read. 
0.48 
8. 9 I make mistakes because I am doing one thing and thinking 
about another. 
0.64 
9. 8 I have absent-mindedly mixed up targets of my action (e.g., 
pouring or putting something into the wrong container). 
0.60 
10. 11 I have to go back to check whether I have done something or 
not (e.g., turning out lights, locking doors). 
0.56 
11. 3 I have absent-mindedly misplaced frequently used objects, such 
as keys, pens, glasses, etc. 
0.53 
12. 6 I fail to see what I am looking for even though I am looking 















1. 3 I forget people's names immediately after they have introduced 
themselves. 
0.46 
2. New I forget to pass on messages (e.g., phone messages). 0.52 
3. 6 I forget what I went to the supermarket to buy. 0.57 
4. 9 I forget passwords. 0.56 
5. 4 I forget people's names, even though I rehearsed them. 0.61 
6. 7 I forget important dates like birthdays and anniversaries. 0.55 
7. 2 I forget appointments. 0.61 
8. New I forget to set my alarm. 0.41 
9. 5 I find I cannot quite remember something though it is on the tip 
of my tongue. 
0.51 
10. 10 I remember facts but not where I learned them. 0.42 
11. 11 Even though I put things in a special place I still forget where 
they are. 
0.57 
12. 8 I double-book myself when scheduling appointments. 0.39 
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Appendix C 
Psychometric Properties of the Attention-Related Cognitive Errors 
Scale and Related Measures 
ARCES Item Mean 
 
17 95 371 602 580 317 117 51 6 Frequency 
0.8 5.2 22.4 50.3 77.2 91.9 97.4 99.7 100 Percentile 
0.8 4.4 17.2 27.9 26.9 14.7 5.4 2.4 0.3 Percentage  
         Measure (N)* 
- 2.42 2.65 3.09 3.44 3.85 4.16 4.79 - MAAS-LO (2146) 
- 2.03 2.36 2.63 2.88 3.31 3.53 3.78 - MFS (1120) 
- 0.33 0.37 0.40 0.46 0.53 0.54 0.63 - SART Errors (1074) 
- 1.07 1.30 1.69 2.07 2.40 2.66 3.07 - CFQ (443) 
- 3.09 3.28 3.52 3.71 4.02 4.31 4.67 - BPS (919) 
- 0.39 0.36 0.51 0.64 0.86 1.03 1.21 - BDI-II (682) 
- 0.54 0.62 0.72 0.97 1.17 1.53 1.69 - DASS-Dep. (842) 
- 0.42 0.42 0.56 0.86 0.91 1.27 1.54 - DASS-Anx. (842) 
- 0.68 0.80 0.92 1.23 1.41 1.57 2.01 - DASS-Stress (842) 
- 3.33 3.06 3.06 2.96 2.87 2.74 2.75 - GSE (618) 
- 0.84 0.88 1.01 1.11 1.37 1.46 1.62 - ESS (1210) 
 






















Teens Twenties Thirties Forties Fifties Sixties
ARCES 3.02 3.00 2.98 3.00 2.91 2.63
MFS 2.94 2.77 2.85 2.96 2.90 2.72
MAAS-LO 3.25 3.35 3.38 3.31 3.16 2.95
CFQ 1.98 1.97 1.92 1.87





















Teens Twenties Thirties Forties Fifties Sixties
25 2.67 2.50 2.58 2.50 2.42 2.25
50 3.00 3.00 3.00 2.92 2.92 2.67

















Psychometric Properties of the Memory Failures Scale and Related 
Measures 
MFS Item Mean 
 
 
11 87 267 362 230 116 51 13 1 Frequency 
1.0 8.6 32.1 63.9 84.1 94.3 98.8 99.9 100 Percentile 
1.0 7.6 23.5 31.8 20.2 10.2 4.5 1.1 0.1 Percentage  
         Measure (N)* 
- 2.29 2.58 2.93 3.24 3.62 3.77 - - ARCES (1120) 
- 2.51 2.87 3.21 3.62 3.92 4.26 - - MAAS-LO (1125) 
- 0.33 0.37 0.40 0.45 0.48 0.57 - - SART Errors (711) 
- 3.09 3.32 3.65 3.87 4.08 4.57 - - BPS (359) 
- 0.40 0.47 0.52 0.74 0.99 1.26 - - BDI-II (342) 
- 0.74 0.92 0.99 1.17 1.35 1.34 - - ESS (768) 
 























Teens Twenties Thirties Forties Fifties Sixties
ARCES 3.02 3.00 2.98 3.00 2.91 2.63
MFS 2.94 2.77 2.85 2.96 2.90 2.72
MAAS-LO 3.25 3.35 3.38 3.31 3.16 2.95
CFQ 1.98 1.97 1.92 1.87





















Teens Twenties Thirties Forties Fifties Sixties
25 2.58 2.25 2.42 2.42 2.42 2.29
50 3.08 2.70 2.75 2.92 2.83 2.67
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